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ABSTRACT
LABOR TURNOVER IN THE CHILD-CARE INDUSTRY: VOICE AND EXIT
SEPTEMBER 2009
LYNN A. HATCH, B.A., CLARK UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nancy Folbre

What relationship exists between working conditions and teacher turnover in
child-care (early care and education) programs? Research has shown high staff turnover
is a major factor affecting the quality of care. Using a new survey and data set I
designed of union and randomly selected non-union programs in Massachusetts, I
examine factors other than compensation that might be related to lower teacher
turnover.
Focusing on different institutional settings, including unionization and regional
unemployment, I use economist Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice and loyalty to
see if “voice” alternatives to quitting are an effective method of reducing exits.
“Voice” alternatives studied include working relationships and practices
between management and labor; identified paths for promotion and compensation; and
processes for making decisions and addressing grievances.
I discuss three research questions:
What working conditions or practices affect teacher turnover in child-care
programs in the private market? Results indicate the presence and type of worker voice
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affects teacher turnover. Programs with collective bargaining agreements have lower
rates of turnover than those without. Unionized programs also employ more staff per
child, pay higher wages, and serve a higher percentage of state-subsidized children.
How does “voice” differ in nature and quantity across different types of
workplaces? I find there is more voice in unionized programs. Also different voice
practices are used in programs operating in a high-unemployment compared to a lowunemployment environment.
What, if any, is the statistical relationship (correlation) between teacher turnover
and voice, and how does this relationship vary across workplaces? My results show a
consistently negative relationship between teacher turnover and voice in these
workplaces even when controlling for wages. Programs with more voice aspects have
less teacher turnover.
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PREFACE
Why child care? I have a long-time commitment to child care. Before graduate
school, I worked for six years coordinating research on children’s out-of-school time at
the National Institute for Out-of-School Time (formerly the School-Age Child Care
Project) and at the Boston After School Experiences Study, both based at Wellesley
College Center for Research on Women.
At the Massachusetts Institute for Social and Economic Research (MISER), I
did research on the development of new state job centers and wrote on closing the
state’s earnings gap for women workers. Both of these issues  training and wages 
are crucial to child-care workers.
I conducted interviews with employers on the “New Orleans Living-Wage
Impact Study” for the Political Economic Research Institute (PERI). Today many childcare workers in Boston have higher salaries thanks to the living-wage movement.
I worked with Scholars, Artists and Writers for Social Justice organizing a
national conference called “Early Care and Education: Crafting a Working Families’
Agenda,” held in November 2000 in Washington, DC. Copying that successful model,
we convened a similar Massachusetts-specific conference in October 2001, where we
brought together academics, labor organizers and advocates to focus on child-care
workforce and paid leave issues, and design a strategy for working together at the state
level. Working Families Massachusetts grew out of this conference.
As my research and interest has increasingly focused on worker compensation
and turnover, I have collaborated with others both within and outside Massachusetts. In
2001, I was a consultant to The Urban Institute on its project “Getting Compensation
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for Child Care Workers on the Policy Agenda: An In-depth Look at Advocacy Efforts.”
I interviewed child-care providers and advocates, public officials, community leaders,
academics, foundation people and union organizers in Massachusetts, and co-wrote the
state site report on how advocates are building public support for better child-care
compensation policies in Massachusetts. This project also published state reports for
Georgia and Washington, available free at The Urban Institute’s Web site.
I have participated in many groups in the Massachusetts child-care community,
including Investing in Children. This group meets regularly to explore methods of
financing early care and education (ECE), examining such issues as the economic
development of the industry and its effect on the state’s economy, tax laws, and
industry-wide economies of scale. I was a member of Strategies for Children’s Early
Education for All “Costing-Out Universal Early Childhood Education” working group
that collaborated with the Institute for Women’s Policy Research of DC to determine
the cost of providing universal, voluntary care and education to all Massachusetts 3-, 4and 5-year-olds. Early Education for All wrote legislation for the state to provide
universal ECE, which was filed in Boston in early December 2002 and became law in
July 2004. I participated in the New England Workforce (NEW) Partners (funded by the
U.S. Administration for Children and Families Child Care Bureau), a four-year regional
effort to coordinate research on the difficulty of attracting and retaining qualified childcare staff. This group was especially helpful in improving my research skills and giving
me a better understanding of what we do and do not know about these issues.
My dissertation had its beginning at a working meeting during a Center for
Popular Economics (CPE) Summer Institute, which brought child-care activists and
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workers together with economists to discuss the state of child care. Eight child-care
workers and activists attended the Summer Institute, which provided basic economicliteracy training. They also collaborated with CPE staff economists in three workshops
on the economics of child care. The working meeting was a success, establishing a
network and foundation for future collaboration, and verifying the need for specific
information on the causes and solutions to high labor turnover in this industry. Once my
dissertation is completed, I will write a short, non-academic report that will be
disseminated by CPE to child-care activists, workers and policy-makers.
Last, but by no means least, while working on this project my mother passed
away, and I in turn became a mother. I experienced first-hand the many difficulties
parents face in securing quality ECE for their children, not least of which is finding a
program with a qualified and stable teaching staff.
As an economist, my focus on child care is unusual and something of a surprise,
even to myself. I find the work stimulating, worthwhile and purposeful. I hope to
expand on this project after my dissertation. I have a large and rich data set and am
positioned to incorporate it with some of the Commonwealth’s data on this population
and industry.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“The single most important determinant of child-care quality, according to a
growing body of research, is the presence of consistent, sensitive, well-trained and wellcompensated caregivers” (Bellm et al. 1997).

In the last 30 years there has been a vast increase in the number of mothers with
young children working outside the home. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 64.4
percent of mothers with children under 6 participated in the labor force in 2000. In
2006, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) at the U.S. Department of Labor reported
that over 12 million children are in child-care settings every day, and more than 4.6
million families relied on child care as an essential component to maintain employment.
The National Association of Child Care Resource and Referral Agencies reports that 75
percent of children under age 5 are in some form of non-parental care.
What’s at Stake?
Early care and education is a vital community resource, enabling parents to
work and contributing to children’s development. Good child care is a first step to
school success.1 Studies show that children who get quality child care enter school with
better math, language and social skills. Set against this background there is growing
research on and awareness of what is at stake in ECE:
• From birth to age 3, brain development is more rapid than at any other time.
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• Quality early experiences and care have a positive impact on development and
are critical to school-readiness.
• School-age child care contributes to building children’s resiliency and
improving their academic achievements (National Research Council and
Institute of Medicine 2000).
The authors of From Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early
Childhood Development put it strongly:
The scientific evidence on the significant developmental impacts of early
experiences, caregiving relationships, and environmental threats is
incontrovertible. … The science of early development is also clear about the
specific importance of parenting and of regular caregiving relationships more
generally. The question today is not whether early experience matters, but rather
how early experiences shape individual development and contribute to
children’s continued movement along positive pathways. (National Research
Council and Institute of Medicine 2000, 6)
Low- and middle-income families especially are hard-pressed to find and pay
for quality care, and economic constraints often force them to settle for arrangements
that are far from ideal. Poor-quality child care can adversely affect development, and
the impact is disproportionately greater for children from poor and minority families
(National Research Council 1990). Research has shown that children who lack close,
dependable and consistent caregiving relationships are less likely to thrive (National
Research Council and Institute of Medicine 2000).
Conventional wisdom in the ECE field is that annual turnover rates are too high,
approaching 32 percent (Brandon and Martinez-Beck 2006). It has been demonstrated
that high turnover reduces the consistency and quality of care children receive (National
Research Council 1990; Zigler and Kagan 1982; Clarke-Stewart 1977). High turnover
increases stress in the workplace and negatively affects job performance and the quality
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of care provided by remaining staff (Whitebook, Howes, and Phillips 1990; Mattingly
1986; Whitebook et al. 1982).
High turnover dissipates time and money in staff searches, training, and finding
and hiring substitutes, as the U.S. Army found when it calculated the direct and indirect
costs of high turnover at its child-care programs. Under the Military Child Care Act of
1989, the Army discovered that reduced turnover with increased compensation and
improved training for child-care workers was no more expensive then high turnover and
its related costs. The Army implemented a new process for all Army-run programs that
dramatically reduced turnover and raised overall program quality (Zellman and
Johansen 1998; Bellm 1994).
My Plan
In the next chapter, I discuss key issues relative to child care such as
determination of quality and its value, characteristics of the U.S. and Massachusetts
child-care markets, definitions of and research on labor turnover, and costs borne by
labor, families, children and government. This is in an effort to demonstrate the
importance and magnitude of the problem both within and outside of this labor market.
In chapter 3, I introduce Albert Hirschman’s theory of “voice” and the
relationship of “voice” to labor turnover. I look at some of the relevant economic
literature on unionism and labor market segmentation. Then I present my research
hypotheses and model of voice and exit. By learning to identify possible “voice” in
different child-care workplaces, I hope to begin to understand where and why child-care
turnover rates differ.
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The research design and methodology undertaken are detailed in chapter 4.
Survey design, development and testing; sample frame, selection and participant
response; survey distribution and administrative procedures; variable definitions and
measurement; and data collection, coding, cleaning and plan for analysis are discussed.
Chapter 5 contains the first of my empirical findings and begins by comparing
child-care workplaces. Descriptive statistics show similarities and differences between
programs with respect to enrollment, subsidy use, staff ratios, wages, legal status, and
turnover. Regression analysis unveils a relationship between union status, wages, and
turnover. Finally I compare program director and matched teacher responses concerning
five aspects of voice to see if there are differences between a program’s stated policies
and the practical view, knowledge or attitude toward said policies through the eyes of
the teacher.
In chapter 6, answers to my research questions expose working conditions other
than wages that may affect turnover, differences in nature and quantity of voice across
child-care workplaces, and a possible statistical relationship between turnover and
worker voice.
In the final chapter, I review my results and consider the “value-added” from
this work. I reflect on the findings within the current ever-changing policy landscape of
the ECE industry.
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Notes
1

I use the terms “early care and education” (or the acronym ECE) and “child
care” interchangeably. The first is gradually replacing the older term, child care. The
terms do have different histories, but ECE has become the national term used to
describe the field of Early Care and Education. I use the term “preschool” or “pre-k” to
refer specifically to programs that serve children approximately ages 3 to 5 years.

5

CHAPTER 2
CHILD CARE IN THE U.S.
What is quality child care?
Quality early care and education has been defined differently across numerous
studies. When I speak of quality or the level of quality, it refers to the observable
patterns of interaction between teachers and the children for whom they are responsible
(Brandon and Martinez-Beck 2006, 10). There are many characteristics and measures of
positive interactions. Both structural and process quality characteristics are important.
Structural characteristics, sometimes called “static features of care,” include things that
can be easily measured and regulated through licensing, such as child-to-staff ratios
(number of children per qualified classroom staff member), group size (number of
children in the classroom), and the educational level and specialized training of teachers
and directors. Process characteristics or “dynamic features of care” typically are not
regulated by state or local agencies and are hard to measure, since they cover the
interactions between children and their caregivers and other children.
Licensing standards try to ensure a basic level of quality. The Massachusetts
Department of Early Education and Care or DEEC licensing regulations require all staff
have a criminal background check and that all programs be safe, clean, comfortable, of
adequate size, free from hazards, and pass all local building, health and lead paint
inspections.1 Programs must meet specified staffing ratios and provide evidence that
staffs are appropriately supervised and qualified for their positions based on state
qualification guidelines. State licensing standards vary widely, and some are quite
negligible.
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Process characteristics cover the daily elements that take place in the child-care
setting such as how the staff and children interact, what materials are available for
children, and how adults support children’s use of materials. Scales such as The Early
Childhood Environment Rating Scale  Revised Edition (ECERS-R) (Harms, Clifford,
and Cryer 1998) have been developed to measure the quality of care children receive.
They include measures of warmth, sensitivity and responsiveness of staff; the emotional
tone of the setting; activities available to children; the developmental appropriateness of
activities; and learning opportunities for children. Studies have shown these process
characteristics are associated with children’s cognitive and social-emotional
development (Helburn and Howes 1996). Detailed issues of quality, such as what it is
and how you recognize it, are discussed extensively in the ECE literature. (See National
Research Council 1990 for example.)
Researchers use a variety of scales to make measuring a program’s process
characteristics easier and uniform across studies. The ECERS-R is a commonly used
scale that provides benchmarks for different levels of quality. It is a 43-item scale
designed for center-based programs that care for children ages 2 to 6.2 The scale is
organized into seven categories, with each having subscales and numerous items to
evaluate.
ECERS-R categories studied when rating programs
1. Space and Furnishings  age-appropriate play equipment, suitable space,
lighting, heating and cooling equipment, children’s work on display, furnishings
set up in a way to facilitate children’s play and minimize disruptions;
2. Personal Care Routines  the quality of routines for naps, toileting and
diapering, meals, and separations and reunions with parents at drop-off and
pick-up;
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3. Language-Reasoning  the books available for children, how the books are
used, and the communication and language skills used and encouraged;
4. Activities  the types and variety of materials and activities available for
children;
5. Interaction  quality of interaction between staff and children, and between
children;
6. Program Structure  the predictability and variability of daily activities;
7. Parents and Staff  quality of communication between parents and staff, the
working environment and professional development support for staff (Marshall
et al. 2001).
Items are scored from 1 to 7, with benchmarks set at each level from 1
(“Inadequate care”) up to 7 (“Excellent care”). Quality care is typically thought of as a
rating of 5 (“Good”) or above, because a score below 5 indicates, “children in these
classrooms are receiving less than the standards set for developmentally appropriate
care” (Marshall et al. 2001, 41).
For example, to receive a score of 3 (“Minimal”) in the Parents and Staff
category, a program must provide written information about the program to parents;
share child-related information between staff and parents; and engage in generally
respectful and positive interactions between parents and staff. The program’s work
environment must have a separate adult bathroom for staff; at least one break per 8-hour
workday; and access to a telephone, storage space and individual conference space.
Staff must receive some supervision and in-service training, and attend some staff
meetings.
By comparison, in a program that meets the 5 (“Good”) benchmark on the
Parents and Staff scale, there is more extensive involvement of parents, including the
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sharing of information about the philosophy and approaches of the program; workers
communicate effectively and supportively with each other and attend monthly staff
meetings that include staff development activities; there is a staff lounge area and
workers get three breaks in their 8-hour workday; and there are regular in-service
trainings, annual supervisory observations and written evaluations. To receive a 7
(“Excellent”) rating, parents need to be involved in decision-making roles with staff and
asked annually to evaluate the program. The program must provide staff with clear
guidelines for their individual responsibilities; involve staff in self-evaluation, offering
frequent observations and feedback; and provide separate administrative, conference
and group meeting space. Such a program must provide support for professional
development and require that staff with less than an associate’s degree in early
childhood education continue their formal education.
The Child-care Market
Center-based child care in this country is provided in a mixed industry.
Approximately 60 percent of center-based programs are run by non-profit agencies,
including a few that are publicly operated, and 40 percent are for-profit businesses
(Morris and Helburn 2000).
Each week, approximately 2.3 million child-care workers provide care for
children up to age 5 in the United States. In addition, there are approximately 2.4
million unpaid individuals, primarily relatives and volunteers, providing care to children
age birth to 5 in any given week (Burton et al. 2002, 2). The BLS projects that wageand-salary employment growth in the industry of “child day care services” (NAICS
code 624400) will be 43 percent during the decade 2002-2012.3
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Despite the clear need for and benefit of quality child care, all too often and for
many reasons this need is not met. In some situations, parents are unable or unwilling to
pay for care. In other cases, there is not a sufficient supply of subsidized or
unsubsidized care available. Low quality and consumer ignorance of aspects of quality
care are also problems. For example, numerous efforts to characterize the quality of
child care nationally have found that 10 to 20 percent of children receive care that falls
below adequate standards, and fewer than 20 percent of toddlers and preschoolers are in
care that is “highly characteristic” of positive care-giving (National Research Council
and Institute of Medicine 2000, 320). Yet most parents believe their child is in a good
program.
Market Failure
Most of these problems can be considered market failure. Typically, market
failure is said to occur when the allocation of goods and services by the free market is
not efficient. Market failure where Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” fails to produce
Pareto efficiency is, by definition, inefficient. Some theories predict that unhindered,
any market can produce the socially optimal amount of services and goods. However,
despite the high demand for child-care services, this market does not adjust and produce
significantly more child care, and the new care that is supplied is of widely varying
quality.
On the demand side, a key problem in this market is asymmetric information.
The quality of the service is vital, yet it is difficult to identify and to monitor, assuming
one knows for what to look. Thus the purchaser is unable to accurately evaluate the
price of the service they demand. This is partly due to the type of good that child care is.
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Goods can be classified into three categories: search goods, experience goods and postexperience goods. A search good is one such as a chair, the characteristics of which
consumers can determine with certainty prior to purchase. A good is an experience good
if consumers only can determine its characteristics after purchase and during
consumption. Examples of this good are legal services and used cars. Post-experience
goods pose even more difficulty for consumers to obtain accurate information about
them. The quality of these goods, such as medicine and child care, is difficult to
distinguish even after one begins consuming them (Weimer and Vining 1999).
The demand for child-care services may simply be very price-elastic. Many
parents would like more child care but are unwilling or unable to pay enough to cover
suppliers’ costs. If we consider child care as one good among many in a consumer
basket, typically parents will choose to purchase the good based on its price, its quality,
their need and the availability of substitutes. However, in this market with asymmetric
information, vastly different levels of quality, and presumed substitutes, price
inadequately signals the quality of service. This may discourage parents’ willingness to
pay for better child care. As noted earlier, poor quality care is not a substitute for high
quality care, but parents and guardians purchase care, a post-experience good, unable to
identify quality or its possible externalities.
Externalities — good and bad — result from the care and education children do
and do not receive. Children themselves and society as a whole enjoy benefits in the
present and future from good child care as discussed in chapter 1, “What’s at Stake.”
These benefits reap dividends for children and society for which families typically are
asked to pay. Some of the externalities from the purchase of poor- verses good-quality
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care are not obvious and unable to be captured in the price of unsubsidized and
subsidized care.
Parents in need of subsidized care have difficulty getting it. There are enormous
waiting lists, with 14,407 children waiting in Massachusetts alone as of June 2005
(Massachusetts DEEC 2005a). Some government policies try to remedy this situation
through subsidies to low-income families, grants for provider training, or incentives for
programs to improve quality and seek accreditation. However, these efforts reach only a
small percentage of children and programs. In 1999, for example, it is estimated that a
mere 15 percent of children eligible for a subsidy under federal block grants to states
received that subsidy (Blau 2001, 10).
In The Child Care Problem, Blau proposes that a key problem here is the
tension between two government goals: to facilitate the employment of parents, and to
improve the development and well-being of children. In efforts to reach the first goal,
policies focus on adult employment or training-program participation, as is the case
with the welfare reform of 1996 (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act or PRWORA). Employment is required for parents to receive a
child-care subsidy. This subsidy is crucial for the economic welfare of low-income
families, especially those trying or being forced to move off public assistance into the
workforce. However, there are no requirements regarding quality of care, and the
subsidy may be used on mediocre care where it will usually buy more quantity (hours of
care). This intervention typically fails government’s second goal of improving the
development and well-being of children.
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Efforts to reach the second goal focus on improving the quality of care by
providing grants to programs for such things as caregiver training or program
accreditation. These subsidies have no employment requirements for the parents of
enrolled children. Often, high-quality programs and preschools are only part-day and/or
part-week, requiring parental involvement and availability, which is typical of good
ECRES-R rated and NAEYC accredited programs. These policies fail to the meet the
first objective to facilitate the employment of parents. Theoretically, a government
policy could serve both objectives. However, in practice we see a quality-quantity
tradeoff, since a given amount of money can buy more low or mediocre care than care
of high quality.
Supply of Child-care
Child care is not considered a promising career. Workers typically are low-paid
and offered few if any benefits. During the period 1977 to 1998, non-household childcare workers averaged $5.30 per hour less (1998 dollars) overall than other women
workers (Blau 2001, 31). During this time, there was huge growth in the demand for
child care, and program enrollment more than quadrupled (Blau 2001, 37). However,
for most of this period (1977 to 1992), there was a downward trend in non-household
child-care workers’ wages at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent. From 1993 to 1998,
the wages for this group grew by 3.3 percent annually on average, adjusted for inflation.
Despite the large increase in demand, wages were more or less constant throughout
most of this era, averaged over all child-care workers including pre-kindergarten and
private-household child care (Blau 2001).
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Under neoclassical theory of supply and demand, we expect this increase in
demand to drive up the wages of child-care workers as they become scarcer in relation
to the number of children in care. The fact that this did not happen implies that the
supply of child-care labor may be quite elastic. As demand expands so does the supply
of child-care workers, restraining increases in wages.
For demand to rise and not wages, there needs to be an increase in the number of
people entering the field, current workers working more hours, or possibly lessqualified staff hired. A combination of these three scenarios is closer to reality than any
one alone. It is estimated that between 1976 and 1990, the number of child-care
programs of varying quality tripled. The quantity of for-profit programs increased by
143 percent, while the number of paid employees increased by a factor of 3.2 between
1982 and 1997. The supply of non-profit programs grew by 43 percent, with a 77
percent increase in the number of paid employees in the same period (Blau 2001).
Given that hours of work have increased for most American workers during these years,
there is little reason to believe that child-care workers are not averaging more working
hours. In addition, the report “Losing Ground in Early Childhood Education: Declining
Workforce Qualifications in an Expanding Industry, 1974-2004” shows that average
qualifications of those caring for our young children have declined (Herzenberg 2005a).
Labor Turnover
Labor turnover is calculated by determining the percentage of labor whose
employment ends within a year or other specified period. Nationally, programs report
annual turnover anywhere from zero to 100 percent, though few report complete
turnover in any given year.
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Typically, high turnover is more likely in markets with low-paid, low-skilled
and low-educated workers. The case of child care is particularly egregious. Across the
economy’s expansions and contractions or recessions, i.e., the business cycle, and
despite above-average levels of education and training among U.S. child-care workers,
at least one-third continue to leave their jobs each year, a trend nearly double the overall
U.S. job turnover rate (U.S. Department of Labor 1998, quoted in Whitebook and Bellm
1999; Blau 2001).
As noted in the first chapter, persistently high rates of teacher turnover in this
industry undermine the quality of service provided, impede the development of
consistent relationships between children and caregivers, interfere with children’s social
and cognitive development, destabilize work environments, and hinder the development
of skillful teaching teams.
There are different types of turnover in this labor market, and it is important to
distinguish between them: position, job and occupational turnover. Position turnover
describes movement of a teacher from one classroom to another within the program or
to a different program site within the same agency. This may be due to promotion,
agency expansion, or a desire to work with a different age group. This type of turnover
typically is considered positive, though it can be disruptive, especially if it happens
often. However, it can be somewhat stabilizing in a program if, for example, the
children’s new teacher is someone they are a little familiar with, having seen them
around the program (Whitebook and Bellm 1999).
Job turnover occurs when a teacher leaves a particular program. Such turnover
may be involuntary, resulting from dismissal, or voluntary, such as when a teacher
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leaves for a better-paying job (Whitebook and Sakai 2004). Usually considered negative
turnover unless a poorly qualified teacher is leaving, voluntary job turnover happens for
many reasons including when people must leave the work they love even though they
and the program would prefer them to stay. Job turnover affects the stability of a child’s
relationship to teachers and is hard for children, especially if it happens often and they
lose a trusted and dependable caregiver. It is unsettling to program operations, and
directors and co-workers suffer, particularly as they try to meet their daily child-to-staff
ratios in response to staff departures.
Occupational turnover happens when a teacher not only leaves her program but
also leaves the ECE field entirely. Like job turnover, this is very disruptive to daily life
for children, families and programs. It is bad for the child-care labor pool, limiting the
return on investments in professional development since it is typically the bettereducated and more-experienced teachers who leave for a better-paying occupation.
Many in the child-care field have friends and ex-colleagues who left child care and
became public school teachers, or moved into better-paying jobs in related care-giving
or service industries in order to support their families. Occupational turnover is
especially burdensome in the field as it reduces the pool of qualified candidates and
often prolongs the process to fill vacancies.
More specifically, annual occupational turnover for program staff only
(excluding all other child-care workers) is estimated at 19 percent. In other words, of
the approximately 30 percent of staff who leave each year, roughly 2 in 3 leave the
field. Whitebook, Sakai, Gerber and Howes (2001) assume that this number is a very
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conservative estimate across all paid caregivers and settings, and persistent over the
business cycle.
Both occupational and job turnover plague the field, and these are what I focus
on in this project. Generally, when people talk about turnover in child-care, they are
referring to job and occupational turnover, both of which are high (Whitebook and
Bellm 1999).
Some turnover of caregivers is expected. The need for teachers changes as levels
of enrollment rise and fall when families move and cohorts of children grow. Often
these transitions are expected and are part of a staffing plan. In addition, a reasonable
amount of mobility and opportunities for advancement is needed to attract highly
qualified teachers. Nonetheless, most transitions due to teacher turnover are difficult to
plan for and adjust.
Child-care workers say turnover is a serious drain on time and energy, making
them redo schedules, cover for departed or unqualified staff, and undertake lengthy
search and hiring procedures. But children and staff are not the only ones affected by
this labor turnover, note Whitebook and Bellm (1999). High turnover is the number-one
child-care problem (other than fees) with which parents are dissatisfied, as it disrupts
their lives and destabilizes their child’s relationship with his/her caregiver. Second,
employers find parent-employees less focused on work when their child-care
arrangements are unstable (Whitebook and Bellm 1999).
Research on Turnover
Research has shown that programs with high turnover are far less able to meet
improvement goals or gain accredited status, both important to improving quality
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(O’Connor 2000). Programs with high turnover are unable to provide stability and
continuity or build trust for children or caregivers. As the authors of From Neurons to
Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood Development state:
The time is long overdue for society to recognize the significance of out-ofhome relationships for young children, to esteem those who care for them when
their parents are not available, and to compensate them adequately as a means of
supporting stability and quality in these relationships for all children, regardless
of their family’s income and irrespective of their developmental needs.
(National Research Council and Institute of Medicine 2000, 7)
When the council’s study was first released, it was hailed by many advocates as
validation that children’s early years are far more important than society recognized.
From elected officials to parents, more people started asking about how children spend
their first few years. New players emerged, and in some states, including Massachusetts,
polices were enacted and money was found to give more support to ECE programming.
Many states, including North Carolina beginning in 1994, Washington in 2000,
and Florida and Wisconsin in 2003, have implemented wage supplementation programs
to encourage teachers to attain more education and remain in the child-care field,
thereby improving quality.4 The U.S. Child Care WAGE$ Project administered by
various states provides education-based salary supplements to low paid teachers,
directors and family child-care providers who work with children through age 5.
Supplements, which vary by state, tend to increase incrementally as benchmarks are
met, and range from a few hundred dollars a year to $3,000 a year (Brandon 2006).
Not surprisingly, evaluations of these projects show turnover is affected by the
value of staying and the opportunity cost of leaving (Brandon 2006). With very low
pay, and low or no entry requirements, there is little cost to leaving this job or
profession. Some evaluations have shown marginal improvements and others indicate a
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positive short-term impact on the ability to attract better-qualified teachers and reduce
turnover. Unfortunately, a statistically significant improvement in these initiatives does
not equate to a large-enough effect to achieve an ECERS-R “Good” quality rating or to
reduce turnover by more that a few percentage points (Brandon 2006, 32). These results
indicate that a far greater increase in ECE teacher pay is needed for ECE to compete in
the labor market for workers with the education and training that lead to high quality
care.
Others studies of ECE turnover suggest ways to address staffing problems. The
National Institute for Out-of-School Time studied turnover in school-age programs
throughout eastern Massachusetts. Eleven programs developed action plans to address
issues important to lowering turnover rates, implemented the plans and assessed the
results. One of the most effective supports received by the programs during the study
was consultation with an accountant who had knowledge of the child-care industry. The
consultant worked with programs on enhancing revenues and decreasing expenses to
find funds for new staff support. In a few cases, the consultant helped the program find
ways to provide staff with benefits, slightly higher salaries, or pay for time spent in
training or planning (O’Connor 2000).
In addition, participating programs each received an incentive grant to
implement strategies they thought would reduce turnover. Some sites financed an
annual staff retreat or paid for staff to participate in regular staff meetings as a way to
increase staff decision-making and communication within the program. Some sites
funded professional development opportunities for staff. One site used the funds to offer
a bonus for staff successfully recruited and retained for more than a year. Many of these
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strategies affect a program’s working environment, and I look at them in chapter 5
using my data set.
The outcomes were encouraging, with teachers and directors buying into the
process and committing to their plans of action. However, the effect on turnover rates
was unclear. Certain determinants of turnover such as wages and overall working
conditions could not be adequately addressed or measured in the scope of the project
(O’Connor 2000).
Taking on Turnover: An Action Guide for Child Care Center Teachers and
Directors (Whitebook and Bellm 1999) was written to help teaching staff and
administrators explore together how to make their ECE programs places where they and
their co-workers could grow and develop in their careers, while providing stability and
continuity for children. This how-to book helps programs define their problem, its cost,
and whom it affects. Through a series of exercises, it directs teams to work toward
solutions collectively, addressing four key areas: the program’s work environment;
recruitment and hiring; compensation; and substitute policies. The book is helpful for
programs, but programs alone cannot solve the aggregate problem for the industry.
In their conclusion, the authors note it will require a community effort to address
high turnover in child care. They suggest numerous advocacy and community efforts to
get others to recognize the effect and cost on the community if child-care teacher
turnover continues its present course. Imagine they ask, what would happen if all childcare workers did not show up for work tomorrow. While working with other
stakeholders in the community can help increase awareness and reduce the isolation and
frustration caused by high turnover, it does not address turnover at the macro-level. It
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leaves it to staffs to work out. Relying on those already over-worked and under-paid
further hinders this self-help approach.
The Costs of Care
Quality child care is expensive and highly labor intensive. In current dollars, the
investment, i.e., the cost is large for families and communities. In center-based child
care, labor accounts for 70 percent of all costs (Helburn 1995; Blau 2001). There is little
data available on the price incurred for other inputs such as materials and supplies,
operating insurances, training, administration, advertising, and bricks and mortar. The
community or government incurs expenses in supporting ECE services by providing
subsides for children, higher education programs for workers, regulation and licensing
staffs.
Studies have shown benefits to children, communities and government outweigh
ECE expenditures. Measurable benefits in the short-term include increases in IQ and
academic achievement, as well as long-term effects, such as improvements in high
school graduation rates, crime, welfare enrollment, income, and tax revenue. (See
Karoly et al. 1998; Barnett 1995; Currie 2001.) One study conducted by Karoly and
colleagues (1998) under very conservative assumptions showed a dollar savings of
more than 2-1 to government alone on the Perry Preschool Project, a well-known early
intervention program with evaluation data on its subjects through midlife. In a speech in
June 2008, then-Senator Barack Obama spoke of up to $10 in future reduced health-care
costs, crime and welfare expenditures for every dollar spent now on ECE programs
(Grumman 2009).
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Despite public opinion polls indicating a willingness to subsidize ECE,
government-subsidy programs do not provide adequate funding (Early Education for
All 2000). While the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) is the biggest of the
government subsidy programs in terms of expenditures, at $9 billion in 1999, it is
estimated that CCDF serves only 12 to 15 percent of eligible children (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services 1999, 2000; Blau 2001). In September 2005, The
National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) reported that only
1 in 7 eligible children are receiving subsidies.
Families needing organized child care, be they single-guardian or two-parent
families, are juggling home, work and/or school, and sometimes other care-giving
responsibilities. During 2003-2004, average annual child-care expenses for full-time
care of a preschool child ranged from $3,016 in Alabama to $9,628 in Massachusetts.
This cost represents 40.7 percent of median single-parent family income in
Massachusetts (National Association of Child Care Resource and Referral Agencies
2005). Nationally in 1995, of families in poverty who paid for care, child-care fees
consumed 35 percent of their income compared to 7 percent for other families (Blau
2001, 26).
These fees are extremely burdensome for low-income families and impossible
for some to meet. Yet parental fees cover less than half the true cost of care, and
government and other contributions only cover another third. It is estimated that the
balance, 20 percent, is borne by the caregiver through foregone earnings they would
receive in other sectors of the labor market (National Research Council and Institute of
Medicine 2000, 321).
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In 1999, the average daily market rates (fee or price) in the 50th percentile for
center-based, full-time care (six or more hours per day for 30 or more hours a week) in
Massachusetts was $42.25 for infants, $37.77 for toddlers, and $30.58 for preschoolers.5
Table 1: Massachusetts 1999 Daily Market Rates

Care type
Infant care
Toddler care
Preschool care

25th percentile
average
$37.94

50th percentile
average
$42.25

75th percentile
average
$46.90

34.17
27.97

37.77
30.58

42.06
34.27

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Workplace Solutions April 2000.
Note: Care type as defined by DEEC: infant care is for babies from birth up to 15 months old; toddler
care is for children ages 15 months to 33 months; preschoolers are children ages 2 years 9 months and
older but under age 7 years and not yet in first grade.

Massachusetts, like most states, offers child-care subsidies — financial
assistance given to eligible parents for child care provided by an eligible child-care
provider. However, there are time limits, strict eligibility criteria, and long waiting lists
of thousands of children as detailed earlier in this chapter. Families may qualify for
assistance because of low incomes, medical problems, early parenting or problems in
parenting that put children at risk of abuse or neglect. Eligibility is determined for no
more than six-month periods and renewable only under certain conditions.
Nevertheless, there is a long waiting list of eligible parents for state-subsidized child
care. When a subsidy becomes available, most parents have to make up the difference
between the subsidy and the cost of care. If eligible parents lose their job, they are only
entitled to child-care assistance while looking for paid employment for a maximum of
eight weeks.
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The Costs of Caring
Most child-care jobs do not pay a living wage, offer significant benefits, nor
enable providers to deliver the best care and education for children (Center for the Child
Care Workforce 1998). Nationally in 2000, the mean annual earnings for parking-lot
attendants were higher than for child-care workers: $15,080 compared to $14,830
(Massachusetts OCCS April 2001, 5).
Child care is an industry that does not reward education. The mean annual fulltime equivalent salary for a child-care worker in Massachusetts was $17,880
(Massachusetts OCCS April 2001, 5) even though 47 percent of lead teachers have at
least a bachelor’s degree (Massachusetts Child Care Resource and Referral Network
2000).6 Note that the federal poverty level was only a few hundred dollars below this, at
$17,050 for a family of four.
Preschool teachers in public schools and in child-care programs have many of
the same teaching responsibilities and care for the same age children. In Massachusetts
in 2000, the highest median hourly wage (across the six regions) paid to child-care
teachers was $11.00, usually with few benefits. The state’s annual turnover rate
consistently hovered at about 29 percent for these teachers (Massachusetts Child Care
Resource and Referral Network, 2000). As reported in Current Data on the Salaries
and Benefits in the U.S. Early Childhood Education Workforce (2004), wages in 2001
averaged $33.50 per hour for Massachusetts’s public-school preschool teachers. In 1999
the turnover rate for Massachusetts’s public school kindergarten teachers, preschool
teachers’ closest “professional” peers, was 9.9 percent (Massachusetts OCCS April
2001, 1). During this period, state unemployment rates ranged from 3.3 percent in 1999
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to 3.7 percent in 2001, dipping to 2.7 in 2000 (Massachusetts Division of Career
Services and Division of Unemployment Assistance 2005). In this strong employment
climate, ECE teachers in child-care programs earned, on average, about one third the
hourly wage while experiencing turnover rates three times greater than those in public
schools.
Other studies report similar figures. The BLS reports the median annual earnings
of Massachusetts’s preschool teachers, mostly in child-care programs, as $22,600 in
2002. On the other hand, in the same year, the state’s kindergarten teachers’ median
earnings were $46,550, and elementary school teachers earned more (BLS 2002 as
reported in Marshall et al. 2005).
Sufficient financing is key to quality education at every age. Traditionally in the
ECE market, wages are directly connected to family fees, which many feel cannot be
increased. Public-school teacher salaries (kindergarten through grade 12) depend on a
broad tax base. One reason society has approved public financing of teachers salaries is
because we know parental fees alone are insufficient to pay professional salaries. The
benefit trained and dedicated teachers contribute to the production of an educated
citizenry is publicly recognized and funded. However, it now is clear that learning does
not begin at age five and nor should education. While public subsidies try to support
quality ECE, these subsidies reach a very small segment of the industry. We must be
creative to remedy the low wage/high turnover link in ECE, but to do so the connection
between low wages and insufficient fees must be broken.
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Those Paid to Care
One director of a non-union program wrote at the end of her survey, “… the
crux of the problem of great teachers leaving — they have to get jobs that pay more!”
Teachers (non-union) made similar comments in their surveys:
“The laughable pay drives most reasonable people away.”
“Teachers in our program are underpaid and have NO benefits.”
Marshall, Dennehy, Johnson-Staub and Robeson (2005) estimated that in 2003
about 30 percent of child-care workers in Massachusetts held a bachelor’s or higher
degree in early childhood education or a related field, while about 20 percent held an
associate’s degree. (Typically directors and lead teachers hold the bachelor’s or higher
degrees.)
The Commonwealth’s child-care workforce is diverse. For example, as much as
22 percent of the workforce (including Head Start) is Hispanic or Latino (Marshall et al.
2005). Nationally, only 11 percent of the center-based child-care workforce was
Hispanic or Latino in 2000 (Burton et al. 2002, 24). This diversity is strength. It
expands the pool of qualified teachers and helps ensure children benefit from the
diversity of their communities. One of the goals of the DEEC is to “support high quality
ECE programs that reflect the diversity of the Commonwealth.” The race and ethnic
make-up of Massachusetts’s children ages 3 to 5 in 1999 was:
74 percent white (non-Hispanic);
11 percent Hispanic or Latino;
6 percent black (non-Hispanic);
4 percent Asian/Pacific Islander;

26

4 percent other (including multi-racial children).
Program staffs (excluding Head Start) in Massachusetts are more likely to be
non-Hispanic white (80 percent) or non-Hispanic black (8 percent) than are the children
they serve. However, staffs are less likely to be Hispanic or Latino (8 percent) or Asian
(2 percent) compared to Massachusetts’ child population. In addition to ethnic, racial
and socioeconomic diversity, Massachusetts enjoys a number of language groups
throughout its ECE workforce, including Spanish, Russian, Portuguese, Chinese,
Hmong, Vietnamese, Khmer, Creole and others (Marshall et al. 2005; author’s data
2003).
Child-care teachers are overwhelmingly female, 97 percent nationally in 1994
(Blau 2001, 8). This may contribute to the low wages and low level of respect accorded
many in the field, and thus affect turnover. But even compared with other primarily
female occupations (excluding health-care aides), turnover rates in child care are high.
(For more on gender and occupation see Folbre 1994 or Joy 1998.) The annual
demographic supplement to the March Current Population Survey is one of the few
sources covering the entire child-care market and can help document the rate of
turnover. The CPS does not include job changes, but it does identify occupation
changes and changes in employment status between a worker’s longest job held during
the previous year and their job, if any, held at the date of the survey. From 1977 to
1998, CPS data confirms that a child-care worker is more likely to change employers
than the average woman in another profession (Blau 2001).
Nationally, the breakdown by age of program teachers and assistant teachers in
1999 was:

27

7 percent 18 years or younger;
34 percent 19 to 25 years (“young”);
17 percent 26-30 years;
34 percent 31-50 years (“mature”);
7 percent 51 years or older (Whitebook, Howes, and Phillips 1990,
quoted in Burton et al. 2002, 25; Blau 2001, 31).
One third of teachers is of “mature” age and perhaps offer some experience.
Another third is “young,” ages 19 to 25. These teachers may be passing through these
jobs as they work toward something else, or they may have new early childhood
education credentials. The percentage of teachers in the middle, ages 26 to 30, drops to
17 percent. This may be explained by the high turnover in entry-level assistant teacher
jobs, where training and education requirements are minimal, or among young college
graduates, who leave for better-compensated careers. This data reveals that the childcare workforce is ageing, and the most educated cohort is in its 50s. As noted
previously, occupational turnover is especially high among qualified teachers. Teachers
entering the field and new hires are often less qualified than their predecessors. In
Massachusetts in 1999, 48 percent of newly hired teachers were less qualified than their
predecessors, according to program directors in The Cost and Quality of Full Day,
Year-round, Early Care and Education in Massachusetts: Preschool Classrooms
(2001).
“For the work that is done and taking care of other people’s children, it is hard
to call out or leave if your own child is sick. This to me is a big problem,” wrote one
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union teacher who responded in her survey that it is “very likely” that she will leave her
job and the field within the next 12 months.
Why does anyone stay in this low-wage, physically and emotionally demanding
field? That many women are willing to supply their labor for low compensation when
there are better paying positions in other sectors suggests there are non-pecuniary
benefits to working in child care. Teacher altruism is often seen when teachers are
committed to the mission of teaching although in a market economy it can be a costly
attribute for the worker. Good feelings and satisfaction from work are important and
enticing, but do not pay the bills. On the other hand, child-care work may provide more
schedule flexibility and worker autonomy when compared to other low-wage work. For
example, a program director may not be able to offer more in wages, but can allow
flexibility in work time to accommodate teachers with families of their own. Teachers
usually are able to structure and run their classrooms as they prefer, within certain
limits. These characteristics are rare in low-wage jobs and add some appeal to childcare work.
Conclusion
Both chapters 1 and 2 have tried to demonstrate the importance and magnitude
of the turnover problem in the child-care labor market. Cognitive research and
economic studies have demonstrated both the present and long-term benefits of quality
ECE to children and communities. Yet this commodity is, in a manner of speaking, a
square peg trying to fit into a market of round holes. The price of ECE fails to signal the
quality or increase the quantity of good ECE. Buyers do not know what quality ECE
looks like, and when they do they often cannot find or afford it. Teachers entrusted with
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the care and education of our children must meet few if any requirements and as such
are often compensated poorly and leave the field for better opportunities in other
sectors.
This situation has not gone unnoticed. Studies are being conducted in other
disciplines — education, child development, child psychology, business, sociology, and
labor studies. Colleges are creating new ECE programs to increase the size of the
qualified labor pool. Philanthropists are researching new program models with stable
funding streams. Community agencies are creating public awareness programs and
materials to educate families on what quality ECE is and why there are few real
substitutes. State and federal governments are debating how best to make quality ECE
available and affordable.
“We need more training money, higher wages and more subsidies in this state,”
wrote one union-program director.
Qualified child-care workers need more reasons to stay in the field. They
deserve respect both within and outside their workplaces. Within, respect can take the
form of better compensation, professional development opportunities, and a
professional work environment with communication and decision processes appropriate
to the education and experience they bring to the job. Outside, respect can include our
knowledge and recognition of quality, a unified public agency to support, monitor and
analyze effective practices, an enlightened legislature, and a stable revenue stream that
encourages the production of quality ECE. Many ideas are being tried in different parts
of the county, and I will discuss some of them in the final chapter when considering
future possibilities for new actions and policies.
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An ECE labor market where competitive compensation reflects the experience
and education of labor is a practical goal. Yet in a fiscally constrained market, can
employees and employers create a better working and thereby learning environment for
all stakeholders?
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Notes
1

Massachusetts Department of Early Education and Care (DEEC) officially
came “on-line” July 1, 2005. It was created by an act of legislation and took over the
functions of the Massachusetts Office of Child Care Services (OCCS) and the Early
Learning Services Division of the Department of Education (DOE). OCCS and Early
Learning Services of DOE no longer exist. However I refer to both OCCS and Early
Learning Services of DOE whenever the original reference does, and whenever I am
discussing distinctions between the two departments. In the first year, DEEC ran both
service delivery systems primarily as they were but has created one integrated service
system. DEEC is supervised and guided by an independent board, the Board of Early
Education and Care, and led by its own Commissioner.
2

The term “center-based” refers to a legal entity (not a family) that runs one or
more child-care programs in non-residential building(s) or space. I use the term
“program” when speaking of any single operation that provides child care.
3

North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) replaced the U.S.
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system.
4

U.S. Child Care WAGE$ Project programs include: WAGE$ North Carolina
www.childcareservices.org ; Washington Career & Wage Ladder
www.econop.org/Policy-EarlyLearning&Care.htm ; WAGE$ Florida
www.fcforum.org; Wisconsin R.E.W.A.R.D.
www.dwd.state.wi.us/dws/programs/childcare/teach/reward.htm
5

A percentile refers to value on a scale of one hundred that indicates whether a
distribution is above or below it. The 50th percentile means that half of the distributions
(market prices in this case) are below 50 percent and half are above.
6

While annual salaries for child-care workers in Massachusetts are higher than
the national mean, the cost of living in the Boston area was 140 percent greater than the
average U.S. city in 1999 (Massachusetts OCCS April 2001, 6).
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND MODEL
In this chapter, I introduce Albert Hirschman’s theory of “exit and voice” and
the relationship of “voice” to labor turnover. By learning to identify the presence and
opportunity of “voice” in different child-care workplaces, I hope to gain insight into
where and why turnover rates differ in this industry. I look beyond market failure
discussed in the previous chapter at some of the labor economic literature on turnover,
unionism and labor market segmentation. Then, I present my research hypotheses and
conceptual model of voice and exit. My focus is on those who provide care to children.
One purpose of this project is to consider a possible non-wage solution to the high
turnover problem in ECE.
Voice
Some economic theories predict that turnover will be lower in firms where
“voice” is a recognized and established alternative to exit, i.e., to quitting. In economist
Albert Hirschman’s terms, “voice” refers to the use of direct communications to bring
actual and desired conditions closer together (1970). “Voice” reduces the probability
that workers will quit by providing workers with a voice and management with a
response in determining rules and conditions of work, by instituting grievance and
arbitration procedures for appealing supervisors’ decisions and demands, and by
publicly negotiating wages and benefits desired by workers. This can lead to a more
stable workforce than where voice alternatives to exit do not exist or are not used.
In 1970, Hirschman wrote that economists have paid little attention to what he
calls “repairable lapses in economic actors.” He gives two reasons for this “neglect” and
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later questions its justification. First, this is due largely to the rational behavior assumed
of economic actors responding to given demand and supply conditions. Second, the
traditional competitive economic model does not require recovery from lapses, since as
one firm loses out others step in and consume its market share and factors of
production, which in the end may be a better allocation of resources. He questions this
justification, noting that the above assumptions cannot be an accurate representation of
the real world.
Forty years later, there are many more critiques and alternative theories to the
traditional model of a competitive economy where comparative advantage and rational
behavior explain most actions and outcomes. However, in 1970 most economists were
reluctant to consider mechanisms other than competition for restoring lagged activity or
correcting poor decisions. Hirschman saw voice, a tool often used by political scientists,
as a useful alternative when the competitive mechanism is not available, or as a
complement to competition.
When a product or service deteriorates in quality, the exit option is demonstrated
when consumers stop purchasing the firm’s commodity or members leave the
organization. Alternatively, the voice option is demonstrated when customers or
members express their dissatisfaction directly to those in charge or through general
protest to anyone who will listen. In both cases, management is pushed to find and
correct the problem.
There are institutions such as families, voluntary associations, unions and
political parties where exit is not typically a desired option to attain some change or
satisfaction. The principal way members express their dissatisfaction in these
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organizations is by making their voice heard. While exit is usually clear-cut (either exit
or don’t), impersonal and indirect, voice is not. It is “messy,” often graduated, and
requires people to speak of critical options without anonymity. Thus many economists
see it as less efficient than exit (Hirschman 1970).
In our time of political and economic upheaval, it is clear that change in societal,
commercial or environmental practices and policies cannot be accomplished wholly
through the exit option. Likewise with child-care programs. The exit option alone will
not force improvement in the quality of ECE delivered. Here the voice option is a
timely and effective substitute and complement to exit.
Labor often chooses to exercise voice over exit because it is more graduated.
Exit assumes a take-it-or-leave-it process; one is either faithful or traitorous to the
organization. Rather, there is another possibility, articulation, whereby the worker
demonstrates both, independence of thought and allegiance to the organization.
If voice is chosen over exit to express dissatisfaction with the current condition,
its effectiveness increases with its volume, up to a certain point. In addition, when labor
chooses voice over exit to alert management to its problems or failings, labor needs to
allow management time to respond. Clearly, voice is not a quick fix; but neither is a
revolving door of workers or customers.
To date, no systematic empirical research has been done on this subject in child
care, even though turnover is considered extremely high in this industry. I focus on
whether a system of direct communication and shared decision making can help reduce
labor turnover. I look at unionized and non-unionized programs to see if programs with
firmly established voice alternatives to exit have lower exit rates.
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Labor Market
Non-familial child care in the United States today is primarily a fee-for-service
market activity. Yet competitive market mechanisms have not produced a level of
turnover at all similar to other education or female-dominated service industries. While
we agree that turnover rates are too high to achieve quality ECE, there are no clear
guidelines as to what is a desirable or acceptable turnover rate. Many in the child-care
industry consider an annual turnover rate of 10 percent (the approximate rate for public
school kindergarten teachers) highly desirable but are unsure if it is attainable.
A classic market adjustment mechanism for dealing with social and economic
problems is the exit and entry of workers. Individuals respond to a divergence between
what they want and their actual situation by exercising freedom of choice, or mobility.
By leaving bad jobs for good jobs, qualified workers penalize bad employers and
reward good ones. This can lead to an overall improvement in efficiency. Yet there are
markets, such as child care, where this exit and entry mechanism does more than
penalize bad employers. Costs incurred from interruptions and instability in operations,
insufficient or inexperienced staffing, increased hiring and training activities, and lose
of firm-specific knowledge can be considerable for employers. In addition, in ECE
programs the remaining workers, children, parents, and parents’ employers incur similar
difficulties due to a departing teacher.
Two out of three workers who leave child-care jobs leave the field entirely
(Massachusetts OCCS April 2001, 3). These departing workers are typically more
experienced and better trained than the workers who stay, their qualifications allowing
them better employment choices. Child-care programs and their customers are left to
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deal with the difficulties and instability caused by staff turnover. These bad spillovers
can have long-lasting effects, especially on children from poor and minority
households, as noted in the first chapter.
Unionism
Many economists question whether the entry-exit market mechanism is the only
adjustment mechanism for the optimal operation of the economy (Freeman and Medoff
1984). In labor economic theory on unionism, two elements are often highlighted. Both
of these, the monopoly and the voice/response elements, lead to expectations of lower
labor turnover, though the degree varies by industry. The monopoly element reduces
turnover by raising wages above the competitive level (the monopoly-wage effect). The
voice/response element lowers turnover by creating desirable working conditions and
providing discontented workers with a voice alternative to quitting.
Freeman and Medoff find that unionism greatly reduces the exit behavior of
workers paid the same wages (their “voice effect”). They also find that the voice effect
has a greater impact on exit than the monopoly-wage effect. In other words, unionized
workers quit at lower rates than otherwise comparable non-union workers, due more to
the fact that unionization transforms work sites through “voice” rather than through
raising wages. Another of their findings is that unionization has a larger effect on tenure
in the service industry than in manufacturing or construction. This makes child care a
particularly interesting industry to study.
Voice options abound in unions. Collective bargaining provides union workers
with an important voice through the process of negotiating for better wages, benefits,
job safety, hours and working conditions. Other voice options are specified in
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Collective Bargaining Agreements. For example, a CBA typically contains procedures
for solving grievances, thereby providing workers with a voice between contract
negotiations. Grievance procedures are an established, agreed upon method for solving
work related-problems and identify allowable processes for dealing with possible
disciplinary action, complaints among workers and between workers and management,
and procedures for lay-offs and severance. These voice structures are not as common in
non-union workplaces.
Labor Market Segmentation
The failure of economic theory to take into account employers’ caring about the
amount of effort a worker expends is a flaw in the standard competitive model. Bulow
and Summers (1986) developed a model of dual labor markets where, in order to
motivate employees, employers may find it profitable to increase their monitoring
efforts or to pay workers above the competitive wage to make quitting more costly to
the worker. Employers typically do this to lower turnover or attract high-quality
workers. These actions on the part of employers help to create primary and secondary
sectors. The primary sector where there is good use of monitoring technology contains
“good jobs” with wages above the market-clearing wage, job security, and responsible
career paths. These working conditions tend to create trust, commitment and lower
turnover in the workplace. The secondary sector is characterized by menial jobs with
lower wages, no real career path, and little to no monitoring as described by Doeringer
and Piore (1971).
Workers in the primary sector want to avoid secondary sector jobs because of
the lower compensation, lack of advancement opportunities, and menial work, so they
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are willing to expend more effort. Workers in the secondary sector envy workers in the
primary sector but are unable to bid for primary-sector jobs by offering to accept lower
wages. If they did, primary workers would have an incentive to lower their effort, thus
defeating the employer’s original reason for paying the higher wage.
For example, a secondary-sector worker tells the employer they are willing to do
the primary-sector worker’s job for a lower wage. The employer accepts and pays less
to the secondary-sector worker for the job that the primary-sector worker was doing.
However, the primary-sector worker was motivated to work harder by the high wage.
The primary-sector worker’s effort decreases because his/her utility maximizing
decision puts him/her at a point where the increased effort necessary to decrease the risk
of losing their primary-sector job is no longer worth it since the secondary-sector jobs
are always available.
In the private sector, child-care workers tend to earn low wages, enjoy little
advancement opportunities, and experience little monitoring or job competition. These
jobs are in the secondary sector. Wages in this sector are constrained by the lack of
public funding and the limited ability to raise parental fees. ECE providers (employers)
face a dilemma. Many want to offer better wages, which usually leads to better care, but
fear raising prices will harm the families they serve. Especially in this sector, it is risky
for a provider to raise wages (take the high-wage road) to gain the benefits and cost
savings described above. This is because with such constrained revenue sources, the
provider may be unable to raise fees or other revenue to recoup the initial expense
despite the cost-savings over time due to increased worker effort and greater desire to
hang on to their job.
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In Massachusetts, primary-sector ECE jobs exist in the public school districts.
Districts administer programs though they represent a small percentage of the state’s
ECE industry. Teachers working in the public-school administered ECE programs are
better compensated, have advancement opportunities with specified education and
experience requirements and are unionized. ECE workers in the secondary sector envy
and compete for the public school positions. ECE teachers working for the public
schools want to avoid ECE jobs in the secondary sector, which are primarily in the
private market. Many workers in the secondary sector, who can attain the necessary
education and training, bid for the better jobs in the public-schools. As such, the ECE
public school openings are filled quickly. This bidding for the primary-sector jobs adds
to the instability in the secondary sector where there are continuous openings. As I’ll
describe in the next chapter, the institutional differences in Massachusetts between the
private-sector ECE programs and those in the public sector were too great to combine
into one data set. A fundamental difference is the primary and secondary labor markets
that separate them.1
If turnover can be decreased by giving workers more of a say in their work life,
this strategy might lower the risk for secondary-sector employers to take the high-wage
road by lowering their turnover transactions costs including staff replacement and retraining.
Taking the high-wage road is a choice. In the public-school sector, it is a policy
choice, and for unions, it is a collective decision. This study may help to encourage
private-sector ECE programs to take the high-wage road (high trust, high commitment,
low turnover) and create a larger primary-sector labor market in this industry. The new
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high-wage providers may increase segmentation in the child-care labor market by
squeezing marginal providers. Alternatively, an increase in the percentage of high-wage
providers may pressure other secondary-sector (low-wage road) providers to improve
wages and working conditions, thus reducing their turnover, and improving the overall
quality of care and education provided.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Many factors influence a worker’s decision to stay at their job. Wage is one
factor, albeit an important one. Others may include benefits (health insurance, time off,
educational support, etc.), distance to work and/or child’s school, hours of operation,
and program philosophy. Many of these have been studied, but many more remain to be
considered.
Research Question 1:
What working conditions affect teacher turnover in ECE programs in the private
market?
To answer this and the following research questions, I conducted surveys of
Massachusetts ECE programs and teachers. Based on the data collected, I group
workplaces according to similarities and differences and calculate their annual turnover
rates.
Out of a pool of possible conditions present at work sites, I identify five that I
call “voice.” These encompass the working relationships and practices between
management and labor, the culture of interaction among colleagues, paths of promotion,
and processes for making decisions and addressing grievances. (Details of these factors,
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identified as “aspects or product of voice” in my model, are discussed in the next
section and laid out in my model of voice and exit, figure 1.)
Hypothesis 1: The presence and type of worker voice affects turnover in ECE
programs.
Specifically, I believe the following working conditions are important to the
degree and use of voice at ECE workplaces:
•

A formal agreed-upon and applied method or policy for solving internal
grievances;

•

A clear and utilized career lattice and compensation schedule;2 and

•

A process that encourages worker voice in policy decisions through the
use of joint committees, meetings and direct communication.
Research Question 2:

How does “voice” differ in nature and quantity across different types of
workplaces?
I compare programs by union status and the regional employment market in
which they operate. I consider the type and quantity of voice in programs, grouped by
union status or regional unemployment levels, an exogenous factor for programs. Then I
use the voice variables I’ve constructed from the data to study voice across these work
sites.
Hypothesis 2: There is more voice in unionized programs, and there is more use
of voice in programs operating in a high-unemployment environment.
However, the aspects of voice most prevalent in union programs may not be the
same aspects used most by programs faced with high-unemployment conditions.
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Research Question 3:
What, if any, is the statistical relationship (correlation) between teacher turnover
and voice, and how does this relationship vary across workplaces?
Data collection and analysis allow the statistical testing of possible relationships
between teacher turnover and voice in different workplaces. Multiple regression
analysis unveils a relationship between union status, wages, voice and turnover,
elaborated on in chapter 6. After accounting for wages, the presence, type and use of
worker voice has a measurable affect on turnover.
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between teacher turnover and
voice that varies little across ECE workplaces.
Specifically, as the use of voice increases, I expect that teacher turnover
decreases.
A Model of Voice and Exit
My model, illustrated in figure 1 at the end of this chapter, shows the
relationships and variables, including turnover, unionization status and aspects of voice
to be tested. Reading figure 1 from left to right and drawing on my hypotheses, the
basic relationship (correlation) is that a change in union status, i.e., from 0 to 1 when
unionized, is associated with more (positive “+”) voice and less (“-”) turnover, that is,
fewer exits.
Union status and teacher compensation data come directly from the completed
surveys. Union Status is shown in figure 1 as “a cause of voice” because unionization
involves negotiation between management and labor, thereby allowing voice into the
process. “Other causes of voice” identified in the lower left corner of figure 1 are
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management policies that may simulate best practices. These operate in the same way as
union status, a change to good management policies, i.e., from 0 to 1, is associated with
more (“+”) voice and less (“-”) turnover.
Other research noted earlier has demonstrated that compensation can affect labor
turnover. Increased wages and/or benefits due to unionization or management decree
typically have a dampening effect on turnover rates. As stated in Hypothesis 1, voice
can operate in the same way. Thus more voice can lead to less turnover. How much
voice leads to reduced turnover is the subject of Research Questions 2 and 3.
Voice is operationalized through survey questions on program practices and
policies. The “aspects of voice” in the center box of figure 1 are:
•

A signed CBA where both sides of the labor relationship negotiate
policies and procedures for their workplace;

•

A formal agreed-upon and applied procedure or policy for solving
internal grievances;

•

A process for making decisions that includes consideration of both labor
and management perspectives though the use of joint committees;

•

Regularly-scheduled staff meetings on paid time with management and
labor participation; and

•

Annual performance reviews incorporating management’s and labor’s
goals.

In this industry, one policy that has developed through workers’ voice is a
formal career and compensation lattice. This is a tool that provides staffs with
information for planning their training and career path, allowing labor to focus on
improving skills rather than competing with colleagues in a vacuum of unknown
benchmarks used by management to determine compensation and promotions. In figure
1, this “product of voice” is shown in a small box linked to “aspects of voice.”
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Other factors can influence turnover rates and play a role in a program’s overall
working culture. Cooperative attitudes, trust and respect among staff and management,
along with training and advancement opportunities are covered in the surveys and can
also be outcomes from management’s best practices. I list these factors, which are not
ranked, in the lower center box. Causes of voice can increase or improve (“+”) these
other factors, and as with aspects of voice, lead to less (“-”) turnover.
While not all variables are specified in figure 1, independent, dependent and
control variables will be described in the research design in the next chapter.
Conclusion
Many aspects of the child-care market such as supply and demand interaction,
product differentiation and price signaling, firm and wage competition, and the exit and
entry of workers do not respond according to the theories detailed in chapters 2 and 3.
Hirschman believed that the voice option was under used, and I think he would
not say differently now. Child care’s unique market characteristics and various
purchasers, users, benefactors, regulators, workers, and suppliers make it a good
industry in which to study “articulation” as a mechanism toward change and/or
“recovery,” as Hirschman might put it.
As Freeman and Medoff (1984) found, unionism greatly reduces the exit
behavior of workers paid the same wages, and unionized workers quit less than their
comparable non-union colleagues, due more to unionization transforming work sites
through “voice” than through simply raising wages.
In child-care, labor market segmentation does not only pigeon-hole workers but
also children. ECE programs operating in the primary-sector labor market are few, and
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therefore serve fewer children than the more common programs operating in the
secondary-sector. A process to lift up these secondary-sector workers would benefit
many.
Much influences a worker’s decision to stay or quit their job or field. Having a
voice at their workplace, such as representation on empowered committees and
effective procedures to handle grievances fairly, may reduce their likelihood of exiting.
Given the nature and structure of unions, it seems reasonable to propose that there is
more voice in use at unionized ECE programs. If so, then as voice increases in the
workplace, I expect turnover will decrease. However, the type and amount of voice
required to produce such an effect is unclear. Study of these workplace practices will
help explain their effect on turnover in the child-care industry. If a management style
incorporating voice has a desirable effect on labor turnover, it could prove to be a costeffective way to lower turnover in all types of programs and especially those operating
in the secondary-sector labor market.
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Compensation
(includes wages and
benefits)

A cause of voice:
Union
status

TURNOVER

+

Aspects of Voice:
*Signed CBA
*Formal grievance procedures
*Decision-making committee
*Staff meetings
*Performance reviews

+

(1=Yes;
0=No)

A product of Voice:
*Formal career &
compensation lattice

+
Other causes of
voice—
Management
Policies
(1=Good;
0=Bad)

-

+

Other factors—
• Cooperative attitudes
• Mutual trust & respect
• Prioritization of staff needs
• Training opportunities
• Advancement opportunities

Figure 1: Model of Voice and Exit
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Notes
1

This discussion focuses on the formal sector. It does not include what is often
referred to as the informal child-care market which is large, unregulated and
undocumented. For some, child-care is not a market activity, and for personal and/or
economic reasons they do not want to be part of a process that formalizes the type and
cost of care.
2

Nancy L. Marshall et al. (2005) defines “career lattice” as a term used to
expand the image of a linear career ladder to that of a trellis, with multiple points of
entry, opportunities for lateral movement across settings, age groups, and programs, as
well as progression from entry levels to advanced professional levels.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
My project studies labor turnover in Massachusetts child-care programs caring
for 3- to 4-year olds. I define a program as a state licensed, non-residential site, open
year round at least Monday through Friday for six or more hours a day that provides
paid care by non-relatives for 11 or more children. I look for what, other than higher
wages, might lead to lower labor turnover in this industry.
To do this, I developed written surveys to be filled out by directors and teachers
at programs selected for the study. This chapter describes the programs and teachers in
the sample, the survey instruments, and the process of data collection. The surveys
asked for information about program characteristics including but not limited to
enrollment, legal status, and qualifications, continuity and compensation of staff. In
addition to information about sample recruitment, selection and participation, this
chapter provides a detailed description of the measures and procedures used for
collecting and preparing the data for analysis.
Research Design
Before designing the surveys, I reviewed existing research to see if the
information I needed had already been gathered in Massachusetts or elsewhere. While
much data exists, none of the research projects I examined asked programs about union
status, nor did they cover the working conditions I seek to identify. Massachusetts
maintains much accessible data on child-care programs, but the data does not contain
information on working conditions or relationships, nor does it identify unionized
workplaces, making comparisons and investigation of these issues impossible with
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existing data. It was clear that I had to design and implement a new survey. Below I
describe the process leading up to my survey design and beyond.
Advisory Committee
During the design phase, I contacted several prominent child-care professionals
and advocates in Massachusetts to put together an Advisory Committee. The members
have two main responsibilities: first, to comment on aspects of the research plan,
including the survey instruments, sampling and analysis methodologies, and then on the
public report and its dissemination; and second, to lend their names to correspondence
sent to child-care providers in the hope of encouraging participation in the project and
use of the findings in their advocacy work. Eleven people were selected. I wrote to each
one telling them they had been nominated to the study’s Advisory Committee because
of their commitment to and understanding of the state’s ECE workforce. I explained the
study and that the committee was charged with bringing researchers and advocates
together to ensure the project did not waste providers’ time and the outcomes were
useful to advocates and policy-makers. Ten people agreed to participate. Contact with
committee members was primarily via email, and none were paid for their
contributions.
The Population
Massachusetts makes a good case study for the impact of unionization, voice
and turnover. The state has a comprehensive system of ECE programs that includes forprofit and non-profit centers, union and non-union programs, preschools and family
child-care providers, with more than 2,300 center-based programs licensed, regulated
and partially funded by DEEC (Marshall et al. 2005). In total, Massachusetts preschool
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programs serve more than 165,000 children, most in state-licensed programs in the
private sector (Marshall et al. 2002, 1). There is a mix of urban, suburban and rural sites
serving a diverse population. Though not mandated, the ECE community has pushed
programs to earn accreditation from the National Association of Education for Young
Children. Approximately 40 percent of eligible Massachusetts programs are accredited
by NAEYC, more than in any other state, due largely to the participation of the DOE as
described below (Massachusetts DEEC 2005b).
The Massachusetts DOE involvement in ECE is unique. The DOE became a
player in the commonwealth’s child-care industry in the early 1990s, seeking to develop
a universal system of early education to support all children by providing accessible,
affordable quality programs. In 1993, under the commonwealth’s Education Reform
Law, Early Learning Services Division of DOE (now part of DEEC) started the
Community Partnerships for Children grant program. This program encouraged
communities and groups of communities to form community partnership councils to
expand and improve existing local ECE programs and integrated preschools for 3- to 4year-olds with disabilities. In each council, a lead agency manages the fiscal aspects of
the program and is responsible for overall monitoring. Public schools are the lead
agency for 69 percent of these councils (Massachusetts DEEC 2005b).
The new funding stream from the CPC grant program which has a focus on local
decision-making created some tension between those child-care services funded by the
traditional OCCS system of state vouchers and slots and those funded by DOE through
CPC. Nonetheless, as of fiscal year 2004 (FY04), 165 CPC councils had developed
local ECE systems in 336 of the 351 cities and towns in Massachusetts.
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Approximately 22,500 children attend preschool in the public schools (Marshall
et al. 2005). However, public-school run integrated early education programs are
different from those traditionally licensed through OCCS. All programs run by the
public schools are exempt from OCCS licensing; DOE established its own licensing
standards and set its reimbursement rates higher than OCCS. Unlike traditional OCCSlicensed programs, which tend to operate full-time year-round, these programs tend to
be part-day and many do not offer services to all children five days a week and/or 12
months a year.
Most teachers at these integrated preschools work for the public school district.
Their jobs typically provide good compensation, require specific education and
experience, and are in the primary sector of the labor market. The job characteristics
and requirements of preschool teachers in the public sector are often tied to public
school teacher compensation and training-requirement ladders. Also, most public school
teachers in Massachusetts are unionized, their salary scales and working conditions
negotiated through collective bargaining. Preschool teachers in programs run by public
schools benefit from these aspects of unionization.
For this study, the institutional differences between the OCCS and DOE
programs were too great to lump together, so only OCCS programs (secondary sector)
were used for the sample, and no public-school administered programs (primary sector)
were surveyed. In 2005, the new Department of Early Education and Care took over all
responsibilities of OCCS and Early Learning Services of DOE, bringing all state ECE
services under one commissioner. Gradually, DEEC is merging the two service-delivery
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systems. This includes establishing one set of reimbursement rates, teacher education
and training requirements, and licensing standards.
Unions
Several national unions have child-care workers as members, including the
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), United Auto Workers (UAW),
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),
Communications Workers of America (CWA), American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
and National Education Association (NEA). While unions represent center- and homebased child-care providers in several states including Pennsylvania, Michigan,
California, Illinois, Oregon, Washington, New York, New Jersey and Massachusetts, a
small percent of the nation’s more than two million child-care workers belong to
unions.
Of the roughly 2,300 licensed child-care programs in Massachusetts in January
2003, 44 programs were unionized and represented by either the UAW or SEIU. This
represented approximately 2 percent of all private-sector, licensed center-based
programs in the state. However, on average, Massachusetts unionized programs are
larger than non-unionized programs. (I will demonstrate this in chapter 5.)
Some Organizing History
For approximately 20 years after 1981, the UAW was the major organizing
force of child-care workers in Massachusetts. Its organizing strategy targeted large
programs, programs with a high percentage of state subsidy contracts, and geographic
areas where many programs were clustered, typically cities.1 These characteristics have
had an effect on enrollment in union programs over time, which is evident in my data.
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One of the goals of the UAW was to increase child-care workers’ wages.
Campaigns targeted these programs because organizers believed a promising way to
raise wages was to get an increase in subsidy rates paid by the state.2 If subsidy revenue
increased, this money could be used to raise teacher wages. This was a successful
strategy. Overall, rates paid by Massachusetts and wages paid to child-care workers
have risen since the early 1980s, according to market-rate surveys conducted by the
state. Because programs negotiated their own rates with the Department of Social
Services based on their costs, union bargaining representatives were able to get higher
wages for their members, thus creating a wage premium for unionized child-care
workers.
However, this changed in 1996 with federal welfare reform (PRWORA), which
required subsidy rates to be set in relation to market prices. The law stated that subsidy
rates be set at the 75th percentile of market rates (Blau 2001). Thus families with state
assistance should have no problem purchasing care from three quarters of the providers
in their area. Average non-union program rates (fees) were in the 50th percentile, while
union-rate averages were higher. Each year since rates have been set by the state based
on regional market rates, non-union programs have received higher rate increases than
union programs in an effort to close the union gap.
The UAW maintains its existing shops, but stopped actively organizing childcare programs in Massachusetts in the 1990s. Under its structure, the UAW found
centers costly to maintain, due in part to numerous negotiations with various employers
and the state, and supporting its members in the grievance process. Since 2000, the
UAW has not had a significant presence in this industry. Its withdrawal from
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organizing, combined with the changes brought by federal welfare reform, has led to a
decrease in the union-wage premium in center-based child-care.
Sampling Frame
Child-care programs were selected from a state-managed list. The sample
targeted all full-time, licensed center-based child-care programs in the state with at least
one classroom that cared for 3- and/or 4-year-olds. (All union programs met these
criteria.) I excluded programs that only cared for Head Start populations, the publicschool administered programs, and part-day preschool programs. The sampling frame
was the OCCS list as of January 2003. To reduce the possibility of a non-representative
sample, the entire list was used for the design and selection of the sample. This allowed
all eligible programs in the state, based on the criteria above, an opportunity to be
selected for the study.
The Sample
The sample includes 59 randomly selected non-unionized programs plus all 44
unionized programs, representing approximately 4.5 percent of the study-eligible
programs. The sample is drawn using the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and
Human Services (EOHHS) six geographical regions, shown in figure 2. I sampled more
non-union providers in regions with more union programs, rather than sampling more
non-union programs in larger population regions. For example, western Massachusetts
has the most unionized programs, so I sampled more non-union programs in this region
than any other. The regions share certain features, including serving a mix of high-,
middle- and low-income populations, and a variety of center-based child-care programs
operating on a non-profit and for-profit basis.
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Figure 2: Massachusetts EOHHS Regions
Table 2 shows the breakdown of programs in my sample by EOHHS regions.
All unionized programs were included to gain as much specific information as possible
on whether, and how, unionization affects compensation and turnover. Unionized
programs were identified with the help of the UAW and SEIU.
Table 2: Program Populations and Sample by Region

Region in
Massachusetts
1. Western
2. Central
3. Northeast
4. Metro West
5. Southeast
6. Boston
Total n
(%)

Non-union
population
n
216
212
339
578
364
196
1,905

Non-union
sample
n
17
3
4
13
11
11
59
(3.1%)

Union population =
union sample
n
13
0
3
10
8
10
44
(100%)

For the non-union program population, I developed a statistically-valid stratified
random sample of the remaining eligible programs. After eliminating non-union
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programs that did not fit my criteria, I was left with 1,905 qualifying programs. I
sampled 59 of them, 3.1 percent, as shown in table 2. A total of 103 programs were
selected.
Selection of Respondents
The OCCS list provided program names, addresses, region, telephone numbers,
program size and other licensing criteria. However, it did not provide the names of
directors or teachers. Therefore, I called each program in the sample to get the name of
the director. I felt surveys generically sent to “Program Director” in manila envelopes
would likely be seen as junk mail and ignored.
To reduce non-response bias, directors received a letter from known advocates
in the child-care field (my Advisory Committee) explaining that economists and
activists interested in advocating for the child-care community were conducting the
project, and that their participation would help shape child-care public policy
recommendations.
Some directors refused to participate, or I determined by talking with them that
their programs did not meet the project criteria, usually because they either served only
Head Start children or ran only a part-day preschool program. Replacement sampling
was used to handle ineligible programs.
Teaching-staff Sample
All programs for which directors received and returned their surveys (n=74)
were called again in May 2004 to get the names of their preschool classroom teachers.
Lead teachers were not considered for the project because they tend to have a greater
investment in their child-care career, having opted to gain more qualifications and thus
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longer tenure in the field. Turnover is highest among assistant teachers, who are usually
paid the least, have fewest qualifications and tend to leave the field, so they were not
surveyed either. In the middle are teachers who typically have been in the field for a
year or more and have a good idea of the work and career opportunities. They do the
bulk of the primary care since they have no supervisory responsibilities.
Teacher turnover is difficult for children, disrupting relationships and stability,
as discussed in chapter 2. Teacher turnover is also very difficult and costly for
programs. The Advisory Committee supported the idea that this staff level was the most
crucial to study recognizing that other position levels do have different behaviors that
would not be included. Studying one staff level did limit the range of possible
responses, but at the observation level of the program, staff in similar positions
provided a more level playing field for comparison.
Eligible teachers were full-time employees who had been at the program at least
one year and spoke English. These criteria assured that respondents had some
experience at the program, but it did not allow for a non-English speaking teacher’s
perspective. In a few programs, no teacher met all three criteria. Rather than drop that
program from the study, the teacher closest to meeting the criteria was surveyed. This is
noted in the data. If only one teacher qualified, she was sent a letter and survey
instrument. If more than one teacher qualified, I randomly selected one. This process
helped reduce selection bias by not allowing the director to select the participating
teacher.
I surveyed a director and teacher at each program to get a better view of working
conditions from two perspectives, management and labor, as I felt it inadequate to study
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working conditions from only one viewpoint. First I asked directors through the survey
if certain structures were in place, such as grievance procedures, open committees,
career lattices, etc., and how well these worked. Then I asked teachers in a different
survey if they were aware of these structures, made use of them, and found them
beneficial.
Survey Design
I reviewed numerous surveys before designing any for this project. I needed to
identify aspects and degrees of voice and get sufficient program information to be able
to compare different types of programs. I also wanted the survey to take no more than
25 minutes to complete, and to contain information that would add to existing state data.
The survey instruments included questions about decisions and decision processes,
staffing, cost of space, committees, meetings, performance reviews, compensation,
grievance procedures, worker attitudes and more. (Many of these are referred to in
figure 3.1 under “Aspects of Voice” and “Other factors.”)
Finally, I requested and received permission from most respondents to match
this new data with existing state data. This will allow me to expand the analysis to
answer additional questions in later work.
Field Tests
The survey questions were extensively pilot-tested. First I sent a draft of the
program survey to Advisory Committee members asking for feedback. After
incorporating their feedback, I sent the revised draft by first-class mail to six program
directors, one in each region, including one unionized program, in spring 2003. I asked
them to follow a specified protocol plus answer a short field test questionnaire that
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included questions such as how long the survey took for them to complete and whether
they found it easy to understand.
After I received the completed field tests, I called each director and went over
their responses to the field test questionnaire. These conversations were very insightful.
In all cases, program directors did not like my original protocol of interviewing people
over the telephone with both interviewer and interviewee having a written copy of the
survey in front of them. They preferred to fill out the survey at their own pace, and
thought others would feel the same.
I also was able to refine some questions and add or eliminate answer choices.
For example, it was suggested that I add the category “not a good fit” to the program
survey question about the three most common reasons teachers voluntarily leave the
program. Those questions I judged most effective in soliciting requested information
were further refined as necessary and used in the final survey, which was mailed firstclass in large, brightly colored envelopes to directors in August 2003.
A main concern was to get a large enough group of participating programs to be
able to look at some industry patterns. For this reason, I changed the original protocol to
align with the field test results and used written surveys without accompanying
telephone interviews. I also hoped this new process would take less time for me to
administer and therefore allow me to increase the number of programs sampled. I am
not sure if written surveys were actually less time consuming, since I often had to
follow up with telephone calls to get participants to return the instrument and enter the
survey responses into my database at a later date.
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The teacher surveys were field tested in the programs that participated in the
program field test in the same manner in June 2004. Teachers were asked to follow the
revised protocol used for the program surveys, which meant filling out the survey at
their convenience and returning it in the postage-paid business-reply envelope provided.
Information about what worked, what was unclear and what did not solicit the desired
information was obtained from the field tests and follow-up telephone interviews with
these teachers.
Originally I wanted to survey more than one teacher at each program. However,
if I were to do that it would have increased my collection efforts and data entry by 50
percent, which was not feasible due to time and budget constraints.
Next, the final version of the teacher survey was mailed in the same manner as
the director surveys to teachers in the 74 participating programs. All completed teacher
surveys were received by November 2004. I received completed program-matched
surveys from directors and teachers within 11 months.
Instrument
Questions in both surveys were geared to answer the research questions. Both
addressed the program’s typical operating schedule, excluding programming or
enrollment for camp, vacation or holidays. The director survey was longer than the
teacher survey because it included several administrative questions about program
operations and finances. Surveys and letters describing the study and its expectations
and benefits to participants were personally addressed to each named director or
teacher.
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Director surveys requested information about:
•

Program characteristics: legal status, subsidies, enrollment, ethnicity and
ages of children enrolled, age of program, hours of operation, budget,
accreditation status, union status, hiring process, turnover, opinions about
their program’s turnover, and number of advertised vacancies;

•

Staff and job characteristics: number employed, information about
ongoing training and education opportunities, salaries, benefits, personnel
policies, and the director’s experience, educational attainment and tenure.

Teacher surveys requested information about:
•

Program characteristics: number of children in their classroom, budget
shortfalls, committees, classroom coverage and substitutes;

•

Teacher and job characteristics: information about their experience,
educational attainment and tenure, age, gender, ethnicity, number of
dependents, household income, additional employment, working hours,
ongoing training opportunities, compensation, working conditions, and
participation in the accreditation process.
Measuring Turnover

In the director survey, I asked four questions to get at the program’s turnover
rate for the previous 12 months. First, how many people worked at the program when it
was fully staffed? Second, how many people actually are working at the program, i.e.,
today? Third, how many staff were fired or let go by management? Fourth, how many
voluntarily left, resigned or quit? For each question, I asked for a breakdown of the
answers by Assistant Teachers, Teachers and Lead Teachers. I computed three exit rates
(involuntary, voluntary, and total turnover) each as a percentage of the program’s actual
teaching staff. In addition, similar rates were computed using the program’s fully-staff
numbers.
Through the process of contacting program directors individually to acquire
eligible teachers’ names, I learned of director turnover for the sample. Ten programs
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(three union and seven non-union) out of 74 had acquired a new director during the five
to 11 months since their completed program survey was returned.
Procedures
In this section, I further describe the procedures followed in administering the
survey, plus the method of data collection, coding and cleaning, and how turnover rates
were ascertained.
Shortly after mailing the surveys, I called the program directors to ask if they
had received the survey and if they had any questions. By first mailing the survey and
then making personal contract I hoped participants would be more willing to answer
and return the survey promptly. It was difficult to get the director on the telephone.
When I did, many directors responded to me with, “What survey?” or “Oh that colored
envelope. I recall seeing it but don’t know what happened to it.” Many directors were
able to locate their initial survey, but one-third asked me to mail them a second or even
a third copy. Most respondents were willing to participate and returned their surveys,
though not without considerable prodding. I spent three months resending surveys and
calling directors, beseeching them to return their survey. Most required an average of
three follow-up phone calls before returning their completed survey. Numerous surveys
seemed to be ‘lost’ in the mail.
Directors were asked to return the survey when completed, along with any other
program literature they wished to share, such as their grievance procedure, performance
review, exit interview forms, career and compensation schedule or lattice, union
contract and/or collective bargaining agreement and personnel policies, in the postagepaid business-reply envelope provided. I received several collective bargaining
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agreements, grievance procedures and other policies from directors and teachers. All
program surveys used in the study were received by the end of 2003. If a director did
not return the survey, the program was dropped and no teacher’s survey sent.
Participants who completed a survey were offered a small stipend of $15 for their time
and effort, and a copy of the final report.
After revising the teacher survey based on the field tests, teachers were sent a
survey addressed to them personally in a bright-colored 9” x 12” envelope. A letter
addressed to each teacher explained that the study was being conducted by economists
and ECE activists interested in advocating for the child-care community, and that their
participation would help shape ECE public policy recommendations. To indicate that
this was a reasonable use of their time, I told them that their director was participating
in the study and had returned a survey earlier. I stressed that all responses were strictly
confidential, would not be shared with anyone, and no person or program would be
identified.
Shortly after the teacher survey mailing, I called each teacher to ask if they had
received the survey and if they had any questions. In many cases, their responses were
similar to those of the directors. Again, three months were spent calling and resending
surveys to teachers. Half of the teachers were able to locate their initial survey and
return it. However, more than one-third asked me to mail them another survey, and nine
needed a third or fourth copy.
The majority of teachers was willing to participate and returned their surveys,
usually after I had telephoned them several times, and in some cases after six or seven

64

calls. Teachers who completed a survey were offered a stipend of $15 for their time and
effort, and a copy of the report’s executive summary.
Because respondents filled out their surveys on their own, some did not answer
all questions. In addition, some respondents contradicted themselves in their answers
and others did not answer the questions asked. Nonetheless, the surveys are rich with
data and descriptions of their programs.
When first reviewing the surveys, I began to call directors to clarify some of
their responses. This proved very time consuming. In addition, I could not guarantee
that all directors would be called and offered an opportunity to clarify their responses.
Therefore this process was dropped after speaking with only a few directors.
Who is in the sample?
Table 3 shows the survey response rates from program directors and teachers.
During the fall of 2003, on-site directors returned 74 out of 103 program surveys (40
out of 59 non-union plus 34 out of 44 union), representing a 71.2 percent total response
rate. Directors of unionized programs returned 77.3 percent of surveys, and directors of
other programs returned 66.7 percent. The higher rate of return from union programs
may be because union programs feel they are unique and are eager to be “studied.”
Another possibility may be that directors in union programs have more time for
paperwork because they have more staff than their colleagues in non-union programs. I
look at this and discuss staffing in the next chapter.
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Table 3: Program- and Teacher-survey Response Rates

EOHHS Region
1. Western
2. Central
3. Northeast
4. Metro West
5. Southeast
6. Boston
Total

Non-union
Program
Response
n
%
13
76.5
4
100
3
75
10
77
6
55
4
36
40
66.7

Union
Program
Response
n
%
8
62
…
…
0
0
9
90
8
89
9
90
34
77.3

Non-union
Teacher
Response
n
%
11
76
4
100
2
66.7
10
100
5
83.3
3
75
35
87.5

Union
Teacher
Response
n
%
7
87.5
…
…
…
…
7
77.8
8
100
7
77.8
29
85.3

In the next phase of the study, surveys were sent to a teacher in each of the 74
programs that returned a program survey. Of the 64 teacher surveys returned, 35 were
from non-union programs and 29 from unionized programs, representing a total teacher
response rate of 86 percent. In contrast to the program-survey responses, non-union
teachers had a slightly higher rate of return than unionized teachers, 87.5 percent
compared to 85.3 percent. These return rates are high, especially considering the length
of the survey and the little time child-care workers have outside care hours, and provide
a good representation of the population.
Of the 74 program surveys returned, five had to be eliminated because they
either answered only a few questions or mistakenly slipped into the sample although
they did not meet the original criteria. In the end, the data comes from 133 surveys,
each completed by an individual in the industry. These 69 programs employ 1,176
workers, 632 of them in unionized programs.
Data Coding and Cleaning
All surveys are coded to hide respondent and program identities. All university
procedures were strictly followed regarding participant consent and data confidentiality.
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Survey questions are coded by subject matter and categorized in relation to the research
questions.
Data was entered in EpiData, freeware specifically designed to make data entry
easy and exportable to statistical software for analysis. I designed two data entry forms
to match the two surveys. All program surveys were entered twice into two separate
files, once by me and once by someone else. The two files were run against each other
in EpiData to find data entry discrepancies. Then the teacher files were entered twice
and compared in the same way. I checked each survey that EpiData identified as not
matching its “partner.” Program and teacher master files were created containing the
correctly entered surveys.
I used EpiData to export the files into StataSE 8. In Stata, I cleaned the data with
regard to incorrect coding and field types, and created some composite variables before
analysis.
What’s next?
In the next chapter, I begin reporting my findings. I use t-tests and descriptive
statistics to compare program characteristics including structure, enrollment, wages,
ratios, union status, and aspects of voice present by workplace. I use multiple regression
techniques to test the effect of wages and union status on turnover. Finally, director and
teacher responses to matched survey questions at the program-level are compared to
identify possible differences between a program’s policies as stated by management and
the practical view, knowledge or attitude toward said policies through a teacher’s eyes.
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Notes
1

Nancy deProsse, personal conversation with author, June 7, 2006.

2

Nancy deProsse, personal conversation with author, June 7, 2006.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPARING WORKPLACES
In this chapter, I compare program characteristics including type, union status,
enrollment, racial and ethnic make-up of children served, public subsidy receipt, staff
ratios, turnover and compensation. I calculate voluntary and involuntary turnover rates
and test for significance. In the last half of the chapter, I compare directors’ and
teachers’ survey responses to matched questions regarding their program’s practices.
Program Characteristics
Programs vary in size, with all but five observations employing between four
and 30 staff members. This variation is due more to program location and classification
as detailed in table 4 than to union status. There are only two non-union programs and
three union programs with more than 30 employees each in the data set.
Table 4: Classifications of Responding Programs
Classificationprogram type

All
programs
n
%

Single-site,
28
child-care only
Part of large
child-care
16
multisite agency
Part of multi17
service agency
Employer- or
5
university-based
Church-run
3
Total
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For-profit
programs
n
%

Non-profit
programs
n
%

Union
programs
n
%

Non-union
programs
n
%

40.6

11

78.6

17

30.9

9

27.3

19

52.8

23.2

2

14.3

14

25.5

11

33.3

5

13.9

24.6

…

…

17

30.9

10

30.3

7

19.4

7.2

1

7.1

4

7.3

3

9.1

2

5.6

4.3

…

…

3

5.5

…

…

3

8.3

100

14

20.3

55

79.7

33

47.8

36

52.2

Note: May not total 100 due to rounding.
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Programs are classified as one of the following: single-site (only provides childcare services at the site surveyed); part of a large agency that only provides child care
(programs at more than one site operated by the same owner); part of a multi-service
agency (child-care programs and other services offered by the same owner, such as the
YMCA); employer- or university-based; or church-run. Table 4 shows that just over 40
percent of the responding programs are single sites. This is in keeping with the state’s
profile for this industry.
Only 20 percent of responding programs are for-profit businesses, and 79
percent of these are single sites. Table 4 shows no multi-service or church-run for-profit
programs. This makes sense, since few for-profit child-care chains operate in
Massachusetts, and many single-site for-profit programs are run as small family
businesses. Finally, none of the unionized programs are for-profit. Given that only onefifth of the responding programs are for-profit, profit status is not used as a basis of
comparison in this study.1
When looking at union status in table 4, over half of all non-union programs are
single sites, and nearly 20 percent are multi-service agencies. On the other hand,
unionized programs are fairly evenly spread between the first three classifications, with
two-thirds of responding programs in the larger organizational structures. This
composition is partly a result of Massachusetts’s union organizing history explained in
chapter 4. The larger-structure programs can enjoy economies of scale in administration
such as marketing, licensing compliance, staff recruitment and training, enrollment
management and payroll, for example.
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Children Enrolled
As noted earlier, non-union and union programs are reasonably similar in staff
size. Table 5 shows this is also true with enrollment: 62 children in non-union and 66 in
union programs. The difference is not statistically significant and suggests
comparability.
Race
Union program enrollment averages 17 percent fewer white European American
children than non-union programs, a statistically significant difference. They serve 22
percent more children identified as non-European American (black or African
American, Latino or Hispanic, Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander, American
Indian/Alaskan Indian/Eskimo, biracial or multiracial), as shown in table 5.2 This
difference is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In other words, approximately
one-fifth of children in unionized programs are white compared to more than a third in
non-union programs. (In both union and non-union programs, the director did not
identify approximately 24 percent of the children by race or ethnicity.)

71

Table 5: Enrollments, Race, and Subsidy Receipt per Program

Variable
Number of children enrolled
[Standard deviation]
Percentage of enrollment by race:
White European American
Non-European American
Director unable to say
Percentage receiving public
subsidy

Non-union
Mean
61.9
[35.4]
(5.902)

Union
Mean
66.4
[40.6]
(7.058)

Union less Nonunion Difference
4.5

38.8 %
(0.066)
32.9 %
(0.060)
24.9 %
(0.071)
29.0 %
(0.058)

21.8 %
(0.048)
55.3 %
(0.065)
23.1 %
(0.070)
76.3 %
(0.053)

–17.0
t = –2.08**
22.4
t = 2.53**
–1.8
t = –0.19
47.3
t = 6.02***

t = 0.49

Notes: Race results are not child weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistically significant at
***p<.01 level; **p<.05 level

Subsidy receipt
Children in unionized programs are substantially more likely to receive
subsidies. Government subsidies typically pay the program less than the market rate that
parents or guardians pay. Three-quarters of children in union programs receive some
type of government subsidy from the commonwealth and/or federal government. Nonunion programs average less than a third of their children receiving subsidies. This
statistically-significant difference points to union programs, on average, serving more
low-income children than non-union programs. This is not a surprise, since the UAW
organizing strategy mentioned earlier targeted programs with a high percentage of
public subsidies.
To summarize, I find that enrollment size is not a statistically significant
difference between non-union and union programs with slightly more children enrolled
on average in unionized programs. More of the children enrolled in union programs are
non-European Americans and are much more likely to receive public subsidies than
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those in non-union programs. These enrollment characteristics for union programs
could lead to a more demanding workload for staff than in programs that serve fewer
children and receive higher (private) fees for the majority of their enrollees. Based on
these characteristics, which are typically outside a program’s direct control, we might
think that turnover is likely to be higher in unionized programs.
Staff Ratios
Government licensing requirements for child-care programs state the maximum
number of children of each age that can be supervised by one qualified staff person in a
specified physical area. Child-to-staff ratios in Massachusetts vary by child age. No
more than two children up to age 15 months may be under the care of one qualified
teacher. One teacher can be responsible for up to six children between the ages of 15
months and 30 months provided four of them can walk. Nine children 30 months to 5
years may be in the care of one qualified teacher. These child-to-staff ratios are
important because the education literature points to low ratios as having a positive
impact on the quality of care children receive. The required ratios must be met every
day. This may necessitate the shuffling of staff or children when qualified teachers are
absent or positions are vacant.
Massachusetts’ regulations require a teacher be responsible for fewer children
than many states. This in turn affects enrollment capacity and program revenue. While
programs can choose to have lower-than-required ratios, it is more costly since it
implies fewer paying “clients” per teacher on payroll. When determining these ratios for
state licensing, only paid and qualified lead teachers, teachers and assistant teachers
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who work directly and regularly with children in the classroom are counted.
Administrative staff, aides, absent teachers, and all other staff are excluded.
Teaching staff
I asked directors how many teachers are employed when the program has no
vacancies, and refer to this as “Desired teachers.” Secondly, I asked how many
teachers are employed presently, calling this “Actual teachers.” When classrooms are
fully staffed, non-union programs seek a children-to-teacher ratio of 5.5 to one,
indicated by bar 3 on the left side of figure 3. Union-program directors indicated a
preference shown in bar 3 on the right for a ratio lower by almost one child per teaching
staff, or 4.6 to one (with a standard deviation nearly half, 1.32, compared to 2.26 for
non-union). These are the ratios directors wish to maintain. The difference in desiredteacher ratios is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (t-statistic = -2.07).
Fully staffed classrooms are difficult to maintain especially if there is high
turnover. Given the hiring process, there is usually a lag between the departure of one
teacher and the entry of another. Regardless, ratios must be maintained daily and so
substitutes and directors fill in, or teachers and children are reassigned to classrooms.
Actual ratios were equal to or higher than desired for all but 8.7 percent of programs,
possibly due to under-enrollment in these few programs at the time.
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Non-Union

Union

6

Number
of
children
per 4
worker

2

1

2

3

4

0

1

Mean of Desired Staff**

2

Mean of Actual Staff

3

Mean Desired Teachers**

4

Mean Actual Teachers**

Figure 3: Staff and Teacher Ratios per Program by Union Status
Actual union ratio means are lower than non-union as represented by bars 4 in
figure 3. On the day of the survey, the difference in actual means between union and
non-union teacher ratios averaged -0.69, or the employment of four teachers for an
enrollment of 21 children at a union site rather than 24 children at a non-union site.
Program staff
Given that union programs appear to employ more teachers per class enrollment,
do they make up for having more teachers by hiring fewer administrators and support
staff than non-union programs? Not according to this data. When there is full
employment at the program, union programs expressed a desire for having nearly one
less child per staff, 3.7 children per staff member contrasted to 4.6 to one for non-union
programs, as shown by bars 1 on each side of figure 3. This difference is also
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Consistent with the other ratio comparisons, actual-staff ratios are lower for
union programs, with a mean of 4.2 compared to 4.9 at non-union programs (bars 2),
though not statistically significant. If all programs enroll the same number of children
and pay similar wages, union programs will average higher payroll expenses since they
employ more people for a given number of enrolled children, as shown in the graph by
all the bars on the union (right) side being lower than the bars on the left representing
non-union programs.
This shows a pattern. Union programs prefer lower ratios, and they actually
enroll fewer children per teacher. They do not make up for this lower teacher ratio by
hiring fewer administrative, management or support staff than non-union programs.
Also worth noting is that all ratios’ standard deviations are smaller for union programs,
indicating that more programs are closer to the mean than in the non-union group.
These findings show unionized staffs are responsible for fewer children on average.
With less responsibility, lower wage rates could be justified. However, research in other
industries has shown that a higher wage is associated with unionization (Freeman and
Medoff 1984). Next I will see if that holds true in these child-care programs.
Compensation
Table 6 shows mean wages excluding benefits paid to teachers and program
directors. Union wages in my data are higher for both positions. However as described
in chapter 4, the union-wage premium in Massachusetts center-based child-care has
been declining since 1996. In 2003, the average wage paid to unionized teachers
represents a premium of $0.42 per hour. This works out to approximately a $1,000 more
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per year, based on full-time employment. This difference in wages is not statistically
significant.
Though unions typically do not represent directors since they are management, it
is interesting that on average, directors’ wages are also higher in union programs, by
$2.51 per hour. This coefficient estimate is statistically significant.
Table 6: Means and Standard Deviations of Wages by Program

2003 Hourly wage
Teacher – average wage
Director

Non-union
Mean
$10.79
[2.03]
17.71
[4.71]

Union
Mean
$11.21
[1.74]
20.22
[4.72]

Union less Nonunion Difference
$ 0.42
t = 0.92
2.51
t = 2.06**

Notes: Standard deviations are in brackets. Statistically significant at **p<.05 level

Health Insurance
All programs, except 11 percent of the non-union programs, offer some kind of
group health insurance benefit to their full-time staff. Also, 43.5 percent of the
programs in my data set (twice as many are union than non-union) offer health
insurance to their part-time workers as well. With regard to full-time workers, the
union-nonunion difference for this big-ticket benefit is statistically significant at the
0.05 level, and at the 0.01 level for part-time workers, as can be seen in table 7.
Table 7: Percentage of Programs that offer a Health Insurance Plan

Plan offered to
Full-time workers
Part-time workers

Non-union
88.9 %

Union
100 %

27.8

60.6

Union less Non-union
Difference
11.1
t = 2.09**
32.8
t = 2.86***

Notes: Dichotomous variables. Statistically significant at ***p<.01 level; **p<.05 level

However, offering health insurance does not tell us how many people actually
participate in a plan, the take-up rate, nor anything about the adequacy or cost of the
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plan. As a benefit, the plan should provide sufficiently for health-care services in
balance with its premiums and out-of-pocket expenses. The insurance plan needs to be
affordable to the employee and employer.3 Also, some workers may be covered through
their spouse or partner’s insurance, so this benefit may have little value to them. Staff
take-up rates here are loosely tied to the amount employers contribute to health
insurance premiums. Responses from program directors indicate unions cover more of
the monthly premium than non-unions, and there is little variation in the amount unions
contribute, unlike non-union programs.
As one director summed up the compensation issue,
Being a unionized program has improved our wages and benefits and stabilized
our working conditions. It has decreased staff turnover. But we continue to be
among the lowest pay category. … Percentage-wage increases keep our wages
low relative to other workers. Teaching assistants in the public schools with no
certification requirements or individual responsibility for children are paid
better.
Turnover
As discussed in chapter 2, national turnover rates in the child-care industry have
persisted at around 30 percent for more than 20 years. The most recent data available
shows that the annual turnover rate in Massachusetts has changed little, hovering at
about 29 percent (Massachusetts Child Care Resource and Referral Network 2000)
despite changes in the economic climate and various initiatives aimed at supporting and
stabilizing the ECE workforce.
A teacher who responded that she was “very likely” to leave this job within the
next 12 months wrote, “I love what I do, just not happy with the salary when I have two
young children.”
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Recall that high turnover reduces the consistency and quality of care children
receive. There are numerous benefits to lower turnover. Low turnover frees up time and
money for programs to focus on caring for children. Staffs dedicate less time to the
hiring and orientation process. Management spends less on advertising and training new
employees. Children have a chance to develop a long-term relationship with their
caregiver. As stated earlier, I focus on the most disruptive form of turnover in child
care, the departure of teaching staff from programs.
Calculating rates
I calculate annual turnover rates by dividing the number of staff who left the
program in the previous 12 months by the actual number of staff working at the
program. These staffing numbers come from directors’ responses to staffing questions
in the survey. As shown earlier in figure 3, the differences between “Desired” and
“actual” staff were consistent and relatively small. The definition of staffing does not
affect the results, and actual staffing data is used here. Three sets of exit rates 
voluntary (quit), involuntary (employer-induced) and total turnover (all permanent
separations) are presented in table 8.
Table 8: Turnover Rates in Percentages

Variable
Quit rate
Layoff rate
Total Turnover
rate

Non-union
Mean
Max
20.5 %
75%
[0.1817]
5.2
20
[0.0635]
26.4
80
[0.1996]

Union
Mean
Max
11.4 %
39%
[0.1098]
4.3
25
[0.0738]
16.6
44
[0.1290]

Union less Nonunion Difference
–9.1
t = –2.19**
–0.9
t = –0.11
–9.8
t = –2.11**

Notes: Standard deviations are in brackets. Statistically significant at **p<.05 level
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The quit variable for each program represents the total number of workers that
voluntarily left in the previous 12 months. A program’s quit rate is their quit variable
divided by actual staff. This is the rate the industry needs to lower. Recall from chapter
2 that it is usually the better-educated and more-experienced teachers who have
opportunities to leave for a better paying and respected occupation.
The layoff variable for each program is the total number of workers that were
fired, dismissed or laid-off in the previous 12 months. A program’s layoff rate is its
layoff variable divided by actual staff. In general, this rate is low. Layoffs are few,
averaging 5 percent here. With voluntary turnover so high, there are fewer possible
layoffs unless there is a significant drop in enrollment.
A program’s total turnover variable is the sum of the quits and layoffs in the
previous 12 months. As with the other two rates, the total turnover rate for each
program is the total number of people who left divided by actual staff.
As table 8 shows, the means for non-union programs’ quit rate (20.5 percent)
and layoff rate (5.2 percent) are higher than for union programs (11.4 percent and 4.3
percent respectively). While there is a difference of less than 1 percent in layoff rates
between non-union and union programs, union quit rates average nearly half that of
their comparison group.
The total mean turnover-rate for these non-unionized programs is 26.4 percent,
less than the state’s average of 29 percent. For unionized programs, the mean is much
lower, 16.6 percent (nearly half the state average).
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Turnover Distribution
Figure 4 illustrates the frequency distributions of total turnover rates as fractions
of my sample. The left side of the graph represents the group of all responding nonunion programs, and the right side represents union programs. The horizontal axis is the
frequency distribution of the turnover variable. The vertical axis represents the
percentage or fraction of the sample.
Non-Union

Union

Fraction
of
sample

Figure 4: Distributions of Turnover Rates by Union Status
National program-level turnover ranges from zero to 100 percent. Turnover for
my non-union programs ranged from zero to 80 percent evidenced by the five bars on
the left half of figure 4. Yet for the union programs, the range was much smaller, zero to
44 percent. In other words, none of the unionized programs had an annual turnover rate
above 44 percent, yet some non-union programs in the data set experienced nearly twice
as much turnover in the same year.4 Consistent with national and state averages, nearly
half the programs in this data set had turnover between 11 and 30 percent. The tallest
bar in the graph shows that union programs are much more likely than non-unions to
have “low” or no annual turnover, just over 60 percent versus 38 percent.
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Less is better
In each side of the graph, the first (tallest) bar bundles together programs with
annual turnover between zero and 18 percent. Specifically 10.5 percent of the non-union
programs and 14.3 percent of union programs reported annual turnover of zero, i.e., no
one quit or was dismissed. Five times more union programs (25.7 percent) than nonunion programs experienced “low” annual turnover of 3 to 10 percent. Recall that the
state average turnover rate for public school elementary teachers is less than 10 percent;
a rate the child-care industry would like to have. Yet turnover rates greater than the
national average (30 percent) were experienced by nearly 40 percent of the non-union
sites (third, fourth and fifth bars on the left side of figure 4) compared to only 14.3
percent of unionized sites (third bar on right).
Voluntary Turnover
Half of all sampled programs had one or two people quit during the previous 12
months. Figure 5, same structure as figure 4, shows the percentage of programs with
staff that quit by union status. Examining the quit rate frequency distribution reveals
interesting results—considerably more variation among non-union providers.
The first bar on the left side indicates that approximately 50 percent of the nonunion programs had quit rates below 18 percent. This is pretty good when compared to
the state average, but it also means that 50 percent had higher quit rates. More union
programs, approximately 70 percent, had quit rates below 18 percent (tallest bar). These
results suggest that the percentage of staff quitting is lower and the distribution is more
compact at the low end of the scale for unionized programs than for non-unionized
ones.
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Non-Union

Union

Fraction
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Figure 5: Voluntary-departure Rates by Union Status
Involuntary Turnover
Involuntary separations are less common than quits. More than half the
programs reported no involuntary turnover (lay-off or firing) in the 12 months studied.
A little more than a third of the programs had one or two people exit involuntarily.
As in figure 5, the left half of figure 6 shows non-union programs and the
horizontal axis is the frequency distribution for involuntary program turnover. Again,
fewer unionized sites experience these separations than non-union sites. Over threequarters of union program directors report involuntary turnover of 7 percent or less.
One explanation for fewer union firings is that it might be harder for
management to fire people without clear cause, if causes for firing are specified in the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Another possibility is that the CBA prohibits
mandatory layoffs and/or requires people in positions that are to be eliminated have
access to other positions in the firm.
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Figure 6: Involuntary-departure Rates by Union Status
Effects of Union Status and Wages
Unions do many things. Here I focus on whether the presence of a union has a
direct effect on turnover and an indirect effect on turnover that operates through the
wage. Similarly, the wage may have a direct effect on turnover. However, since unions
also raise wages, omission of union status in the turnover regression will bias the
coefficient on wages. Nonetheless, it is instructive to get a handle on the aggregate
effect of wages and union status on teacher turnover. Table 9 reports the results of three
OLS specifications where the dependent variable is the teacher turnover rate and the
independent variables are union status and teacher average wage.
Specification 1 of table 9 is a bivariate regression of the turnover rate on union
status with no controls for confounding factors. The union variable combines the voice
and wage effects but allows a look at the effect of union status on turnover. The
coefficient says that union status is associated with a statistically significant reduction in
turnover of 8.3 percentage points.
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Table 9: Regressions of Turnover on Union Status and Average Wage
Specification
Variable
Union Status

Average Wage

Adjusted
R<2>

[1]
Est. Coef.
(Std. Error)
–0.083
(0.044)*

[2]

…

0.006
(0.012)

0.008
(0.012)

0.036

–0.012

0.029

…

[3]

–0.086
(0.045)*

Notes: Results are not weighted. n=69 Significant at *p<.10 level

Specification 2 regresses turnover on wage. Here the teacher average-wage
variable combines the union and wage effects but allows a test of whether lower
turnover is associated with higher wages. Recall from table 6 that the average unionwage premium for teachers in the data is less than 50 cents an hour. Here the coefficient
for average wage, which is not statistically significant, is unexpectedly positive but very
small, 0.6 percentage-points.
Specification 3 regresses turnover on union status holding the wage constant.
Controlling for wage does not reduce the effect of unionization on turnover in this data
set. When wage, a mechanism through which the union may work, is included, union
status still is associated with a statistically significant (t = –1.94) reduction of 8.6
percentage-points in turnover per dollar of wage. This is a fairly large effect compared
to observed turnover rates in ECE and indicates that unions matter.
Unionized workplaces in my data have statistically significant lower turnover
rates than non-union workplaces (table 8). The higher union wage does not appear to
account for any of the difference between union and non-union turnover rates. In
consideration of possible omitted variable bias and for a better understanding of why
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union workplaces have lower turnover, I expand on this analysis and consider effects of
voice and unemployment in chapter 6. However, first let us look at the issue of how
much management and labor agree on the presence and use of workplace practices.
To Agree or Disagree
As described in the previous chapter, I administered two surveys, one to the onsite program director and a different survey to a teacher at the same program working in
a classroom with 3- and 4-year-olds. By surveying both sides of the working
relationship, I hope to be able to get a good picture of working conditions at the
programs. I look at programs to see if the workers have or perceive having recognized
and established methods of communicating with management, “voice.”
Recall from chapter 3 that “voice” can reduce the probability workers will quit
by giving them a mechanism to express concerns, and management with a response in
determining rules and conditions of work, instituting grievance and arbitration
procedures for appealing supervisors’ decisions and demands, and publicly negotiating
wages and benefits. This can lead to a more stable workforce than where voice
alternatives to exit do not exist.
Many factors influence a worker’s decision to stay at their job. Unionized
programs have signed collective bargaining agreements, allowing workers or their
representatives to participate in the negotiation of their contracts and thus have a say in
their work environment. Grievance procedures, career lattices, staff meetings, annual
reviews and other mechanisms typically are part of a CBA.
Surveying both sides of the labor relationship can shed light on the level of
agreement on working conditions at a program. Often people make decisions based on
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what they think the situation is, even though the reality may be different. Due to selfreporting, the accuracy of these program policies is not assured. This is not a problem
since it is the views of the manager (director) and the worker (teacher) that are
important to understanding the workplace culture. Staffs tend to make decisions, such as
to stay or quit, based on how they feel overall about their workplace. As one (male)
unionized teacher wrote, “Have many systems and structures by name, but they are
often quite dysfunctional.”
In this analysis of asymmetric disagreement or misclassification, the teacher’s
response may be a mix of two things, her knowledge about the existence of the specific
practice and her perception about the quality or effectiveness of the voice practice at the
workplace. This causes the slippage.
Question of Union status
I have 60 matched program and teacher surveys. First I look at the amount of
agreement between a teacher and director on whether their program is unionized and
has a signed CBA. This is the only comparison where I verify the accuracy of the
responses, because whether or not a program is unionized is key to much of my later
analyses. Eighty-seven percent agree on their program’s union status. Five teachers left
the question blank. Of these five, three programs are unionized and two are not. Three
teachers did not know their programs were unionized.
With such a high rate of agreement on this issue, it is not a good candidate for
the comparisons of responses between program directors and teachers. This degree of
agreement indicates that there is not significant confusion about the unionization status
of these workplaces; teachers and directors know if their workplace is unionized.
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Questions of Voice
I compare the responses of a teacher and her director (manager) to five questions
identified below as A. – E. in each of the 60 programs. More than half of all program
directors and their teachers agree with each other. Naturally, there is disagreement too.
On average, nearly a quarter of responding teachers disagree with their director over the
existence of specific voice aspects or policies at their workplace. In some cases,
teachers do not know if a certain policy exists at their program, despite having worked
there for more than a year. This may indicate that it is not something management
explains or shares regularly with workers. In other cases, the policy is “in the book” but
the teacher doesn’t see it as effective or utilized. In addition, the results show that on
average there is more agreement between management and labor in unionized than in
non-unionized programs for the practices queried.
Four sets of programs are identified in the cross-tabulations that follow. The first
set, referred to as Group I, always represents the teacher-director pairs that agree the
voice practice is present, and Group IV represents the pairs that agree the voice aspect is
not present or in use at their program. In Groups II and III, the teacher-director pairs
disagree. Programs where the teacher replies negatively, while their director reports
voice in use at their program are in Group II. Group III is the opposite, with the teacher
reporting the voice aspect is present and in use, and their director reporting it is not.
I propose that teacher turnover is greatest among programs where both labor and
management agree there is no worker voice, Group IV, followed by Group II where
only the teacher reports there is no worker voice. Where employee dissatisfaction is
high, for whatever reason, perception of voice will be low. Next are the programs in
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Group III where the teacher reports there is voice. I believe turnover is not has high in
this group because of the importance of the employee’s feelings about the use and
effectiveness of their voice. Turnover will be the lowest (desirable) in Group I programs
in which the teacher-director pair agree voice is present and in use. Thus in this group,
teachers do not misclassify. Turnover rates in Group I will be less than or better than
those in Group III, which will be less than turnover in Group II, which is less than
turnover in Group IV.
Four comparisons are tested. The agreement-disagreement matrix is modeled in
table 10, showing how the results for each voice aspect are displayed later in table 11a
through table 11e. In each cell, the mean turnover rate for the programs in that group,
the disagreement or misclassification rate for the programs in that group, and the
number of programs in that group are listed. The misclassification rate is the fraction of
programs with the teacher disagreeing with the director. Thus it is equal to zero when
the teacher-director pairs agree, i.e., Groups I and IV in the diagonal cells. In the offdiagonal cells, the misclassification rate is the percentage of programs where teachers
“misclassify” divided by the total of programs in that row.
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Table 10: Agreement-Disagreement Matrix Model
Teacher
Voice
aspect

Voice
Director

Row total n

Not
Row total n

Voice

Not

Group I
Agree voice is present.
Turnover rate
Misclassification rate
number of programs
Group III
Teacher “misclassifies”
Turnover %
Misclassification %
n

Group II
Teacher “misclassifies”
Turnover %
Misclassification %
n
Group IV
Agree voice is not present.
Turnover %
Misclassification %
n

To simplify the language in this analysis, I refer to the director’s response as
“correct” regarding whether the voice aspect is in place and in use. This is justified
because more than 50 percent of labor-management pairs agree with regard to these
voice practices. Therefore when the teacher disagrees with the director, the teacher is
misclassifying. If it is a dissatisfying workplace, i.e., has high turnover, then teachers
think they do not have good voice options, even if they actually do.
If the presence and use of a given voice aspect affects teacher-turnover rates,
there should be a significant difference in turnover between Groups I and IV, those
teacher-director pairs who agree the voice aspect is present and in use, and those who
agree it is not. (This relationship is further studied in chapter 6.) Here I find a
statistically significant difference in turnover for three voice aspects: career and
compensation lattices, grievance procedures and exit interview protocols. Thus for each
of these three voice aspects, when directors and teachers agree that worker voice is

90

present, there is a statistically significant difference in turnover rates than when they
agree it is not.
Now consider the impact of the teacher’s perception. If it is what a teacher
thinks exists at her program that is associated with turnover, then responses from
teachers indicating that they perceive or think a voice practice is in use (Groups I and
III) should have similar turnover rates to one another, and responses from teachers who
think there is no such voice practice (Groups II and IV) should have similar turnover.
This presents the following comparison questions:
1. Does the director’s response matter, given that the teacher thinks the voice
aspect is in use (Group I versus Group III)?
2. Does the director’s response matter, given that the teacher thinks the voice
aspect is not in use (Group II versus Group IV)?
However, if it is the actual existence and use of a voice practice that is
associated with teachers’ voluntary turnover rates, then directors’ reports that a voice
practice is in use (Groups I and II) should have similar turnover to one another, and
reports from directors that there is no such voice practice (Groups III and IV) should
have similar turnover rates. Two additional comparisons are done to answer these
questions:
3. Does what the teacher thinks matter, given that the director says the voice
practice is present and in use at the program (Group I versus Group II)?
4. Does what the teacher thinks matter, given that the director says the voice
practice is not in use at their program (Group III versus Group IV)?
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I make these comparisons to examine the role, if any, of voice practices that are
perceived to be in use compared to those that actually are in use. For each of the five
voice practices, I test whether the comparisons are statistically significant.
A. Does your program have and use a career and compensation schedule or
lattice?
Fifty out of the 60 directors respond that their program uses a career and
compensation lattice or ladder to determine wages and promotions. Not as many
teachers agree. The diagonal (white cells) in the cross-tabulations represent agreement
between the program director and their teacher, whereas the cross-diagonal (shaded)
cells represent programs where the teacher and her director disagree.
In table 11a, Group I includes 30 teacher-and-director pairs (15 union and 15
non-union) who agree that there is a career schedule or lattice in use at their workplace.
In other words, in half of the programs, the director and teacher agree with each other.
As I expected, the turnover mean for this group is the lowest of the four tabulations
(groups), at 22.4 percent. (This varies little when sorted by union status.)
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Table 11a: Agree-Disagree Matrix for Career Lattice
Teacher
Career
Lattices

Voice
Director

Row n= 50

Voice

Not

Group I

Group II

22.4 %
0
30
Group III

27.6%
40 %
20
Group IV

25.5%
50 %
5

43.6 %
0
5^

Not
Row n=10
^ All are non-union programs.

Group IV also represents staff pairs that agree. It includes five teacher-anddirector pairs, all from non-union programs, who agree their program does not have a
career and compensation lattice. While there are only five programs in this group, the
turnover mean is nearly double that of any other group. The difference in turnover
between programs with and those without this voice practice (Groups I and IV) is
statistically significant (p< .05), signifying that voice through career ladders is
associated with lower turnover rates.
In the groups where teachers respond that they believe a career lattice is in use
(Groups I and III in table 11a), turnover means are similar, indicating that the director’s
response is not paramount. This is in answer to the first comparison question noted
above. There is an association with lower turnover at programs where the teacher thinks
there is a career lattice.
The off-diagonal cells (shaded blocks) show programs with disagreement
between directors and teachers. For career lattices and all but two cases that follow, the
disagreement is asymmetric. The number or percentage of programs with teachers
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misclassifying that there is a lattice and those misclassifying that there is not are not
equal, so it is unlikely to be due to measurement error. Group II includes 20 programs
where the director reports that the program has a career lattice but the teacher disagrees
with 40 percent misclassified. The average teacher-turnover rate for Group II is higher
than Groups’ I and III, where the teachers believe career lattices are in use.
Sorting the responses to this question by union status does not change the
relationships between groups. Both union and non-union teachers are less likely than
their director to be aware of and benefit from the planning and information provided by
career and compensation ladders. If there is such a ladder that management refers to at
these programs, its use and benefits are limited to one side of the labor-management
relationship. When teachers are unaware of or denied access to the method management
uses to determine wages and promotions that information cannot be accurately
incorporated into their career decisions, such as what training and education to pursue,
merits of job tenure, and view of advancement opportunities.
B. Has the program charged a joint committee to look into a work-related issue?
In eight programs (Group I in table 11b), the director and teacher agree that their
program’s culture includes committee(s) empowered to make decisions on work-related
issues, and 13 additional directors (Group II) also report this. These two groups have the
lowest turnover means, contrary to my expectation. What the teacher thinks does not
significantly alter turnover rates when the director reports joint committees function at
the program. This result is supported by the high misclassification rate in Group II
along with the low turnover rates in Groups I and II in table 11b.
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Turnover means are similar when the teacher thinks joint committees are able to
effect change, despite what their director reports. On the other hand, when the teacher
thinks the voice aspect is not in use (as is the case in 44 out 60 observations), the
director’s response does matter, and the difference in turnover rates between Groups II
and IV is statistically significant. (This result holds true also when only non-union
observations are used.)
The disagreement (off-diagonal) is asymmetric (not statistically significant) with
more teachers disagreeing or misclassifying that joint committees are not part of the
program culture.
Recall that there are 27 union and 33 non-union programs. In five non-union and
three union programs, respondents agree that inclusive committees are empowered to
make decisions on work-related issues. For the union sites, the number or percentage of
programs with teachers misclassifying that there are empowered committees are equal
to those misclassifying that there are not. Thus the disagreement between teachers and
directors is symmetric, and therefore is probably due to measurement error. However,
the disagreement in the non-union programs is asymmetric, with a total of 11 out of 33
director-teacher pairs disagreeing.
The lowest non-union turnover rates (17.6 and 17.1 percent) occur where the
director reports that committees are inclusive and empowered (Groups I and II). Oddly
the lowest turnover rates in the union observations (15 and 19.7 percent) are where the
teacher perceives no empowered committees at work (Groups II and IV).
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Table 11b: Agree-Disagree for Joint Committees
Teacher
Joint
Committees

Voice
Director

Row n=21

Not
Row n=39

Voice

Not

Group I

Group II*

21.9 %
0
8
Group III

16.3 %
61.9%
13
Group IV*

24.4 %
20.5 %
8

31.9 %
0
31

Note: *Statistically significant difference p<.05 between Groups II and IV.

C. Are there regularly scheduled productive staff meetings on paid time?
Many programs use staff meetings to facilitate communication and work.
However in this analysis, the question does not only ask if there are staff meetings.
Recall that the objective is to get a good picture of working conditions. Staff meetings
viewed as unpredictable and/or unproductive do not facilitate communication.
Therefore a yes to this questions, must be yes to all three parts of it. In other words,
there are regularly scheduled staff meetings, and they are conducted during paid time,
and the respondent views them as productive. (In the survey, these are each distinct
questions.)
In two-thirds of the programs, respondents agree that they have regularly
scheduled and productive staff meetings during paid time. (This agreement rate varies
little when sorted by union status: 63 percent union and 70 percent non-union.) When
looking at programs where management and labor responses disagree, again the
directors are more likely than teachers to see this aspect of their program positively.
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Note that in three programs (Group III in table 11c), only the teacher perceives
regular and effective staff meetings. Though few, this group has the lowest turnover
mean, actually the lowest of any of the five sixty-program tabulations, 15.6 percent.
Likewise, it appears less favorable to low turnover rates when the teacher, in agreement
or not with her director, views the staff meetings negatively, as in Groups II and IV.
These results support my central hypothesis that employee’s feelings are important.
Where employee dissatisfaction is high, for whatever reason, perception of voice is low.
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Table 11c: Agree-Disagree for Staff Meetings
Teacher
Staff
Meetings

Voice
Director

Row n=54

Voice

Not

Group I

Group II

24.1 %
0
40
Group III

33.3 %
25.9 %
14
Group IV

15.6 %
50 %
3

31.1 %
0
3^

Not
Row n=6
^ All non-union programs

The disagreement (off-diagonal) for staff meetings is asymmetric, and this is the
only voice practice where teachers misclassifying voice have the highest turnover mean
(though only slightly greater than director-teacher pairs in agreement in Group IV).
None of the comparisons tested are statistically significant, consistent with results for
staff meetings found in the next chapter.
D. Are there formal written grievance procedures, and do grievances get handled
fairly and professionally?
As shown in table 11d, teachers and directors in more than half the programs
agree that their program has formal, written grievance procedures providing fair and
professional treatment. Again, this can be viewed as two questions. However the mere
presence of a voice aspect that is neither used nor viewed effective provides no practical
course for communicating with management.
An additional 14 directors indicate they too, believe their program has such
procedures though their teachers disagree. This may be another example of incomplete
information. Management knows of the procedures and can utilize them. However,
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teachers either do not know about this “tool” for resolving conflict, or they may feel that
grievances are not handled fairly.
Table 11d: Agree-Disagree for Grievance Procedures
Teacher
Grievance
procedures

Voice
Director

Row n=52

Not
Row n= 8

Voice

Not

Group I

Group II

22 %
0
38
Group III*

31.6 %
26.9 %
14
Group IV*

29.5 %
75 %
6

57.7 %
0
2^

Note: * Statistically significant difference, p<.05 between Groups III and IV.
^Both programs are non-union.

While there are only two teacher-director pairs that agree their programs are
without formal grievance procedures, these programs have substantially higher turnover
rates. The difference between this group and Group I that agrees grievance procedures
are present is statistically significant (p< .05), indicating that this voice aspect matters.
When limiting the comparison to non-union programs, the result remains statistically
significant.
Consider the fourth comparison question asked earlier in this section. For
Groups III and IV, directors report no grievance procedures. Yet turnover rates in table
11d in these two groups are not similar (29.5 and 57.7 percent respectively), indicating
that what the teachers perceive is important, and in this case, associated with a
statistically significant difference. When comparing non-union Groups III and IV
exclusively, the difference in turnover is still statistically significant.
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More than half the teacher-director pairs in both union and non-union programs
agree that this voice aspect is in use, and the mean turnover rates are within a half of a
percentage point of each other regardless of union status.
The similar turnover in union Groups I and II suggests that turnover rates vary
little in union programs where the director reports formal grievance procedures in use,
despite the teacher’s view. Yet in these programs, mean turnover rates are
approximately 10 percentage points higher than when union directors report no
grievance procedures, though all means are below 22 percent.
In both union and non-union observations, the asymmetric results are more than
2-1, with more directors reporting the presence of these procedures than teachers. The
lowest turnover rates are in the union cells. Only when non-union teacher-director pairs
agree that this voice aspect is in use is non-union turnover below 30 percent. The higher
non-union turnover rates should lead some programs to consider implementing and
publicizing a formal and fair grievance procedure.
E. Does your program conduct exit interviews or a similar process?
All but one program reported doing annual-performance reviews (a voice aspect
listed in my model, figure 3.1), so for the analysis I substitute exit interviews, another
one-on-one-type meeting. Exit interviews are an opportunity for a worker to speak
directly with management on behalf of colleagues who may agree about the working
environment (big picture). I see the exiting person as a staff proxy or representative
using voice as a mechanism for future change even though that particular worker will
not benefit from any improvements made as a result of their interview. Exit interviews
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can be a (good faith) signal from management to workers that it matters to them why
workers leave. It provides workers a collective voice at the program level—my level of
observation.
In exactly 18 programs, director-teacher pairs agree that exit interviews are done
with a person when they leave, and another 18 agree that such interviews are not done.
The former shows the lowest turnover, 19.5 percent, and the latter the highest turnover,
at 40 percent in the tabulation table 11e, and represents a statistically significant
difference.
Table 11e: Agree-Disagree Matrix for Exit Interviews
Teacher
Exit
Interviews

Voice
Director

Row n=35

Not
Row n= 25

Voice

Not

Group I

Group II*

19.5 %
0
18
Group III

22 %
48.6 %
17
Group IV*

20.8 %
28 %
7

40 %
0
18

Note: *Statistically significant difference, p< .05 between Group II and IV.

It seems reasonable that more directors are aware of this procedure since they
conduct the interview when a worker leaves. However, in seven programs the director
says exit interviews are not done, but their teacher misclassifies, reporting that such
interviews are done. This “no-yes” result is odd. Perhaps these interviews are done at
the agency level and are not shared with the program director. If this is the case, the
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interview’s usefulness is limited since the departing worker’s supervisor is not aware of
the issues discussed relating to their staff’s exit.
The difference in turnover rates between Groups II and IV in table 11e is
statistically significant for the whole data set as well as for the non-union data set. This
may be an example of where the use of a policy by management is more relevant to low
turnover than the teacher’s perception, since it is the director who remains at the
program and has an opportunity to implement changes that may be realized while
interviewing a departing teacher. This kind of voice is relevant at the program level,
providing staff another vehicle to communicate with management.
This is the second example where a disagreement between union teachers and
their directors is symmetric; it is likely due to measurement error among the union
observations. However, the disagreement among the non-union programs is quite
unbalanced, with only one program in Group III and eleven in Group II. The lowest
non-union turnover mean, 18 percent, is associated with the eleven programs where
teachers misclassify when reporting on exit interviews. On the other hand, the six union
programs in Group II are associated with the second-highest union turnover mean of
29.3 percent, one percentage point less than the mean for the three Group IV programs.
Fifteen non-union staff pairs agree that they do not conduct exit interviews at
their program (Group IV), five times more than in union programs. Regardless of union
status, Groups IV have the highest turnover means in relation to their colleagues, with
the non-union mean 10 percentage points higher, at 40.7 percent.
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In summary
More often than their teachers, directors report the presence and effective use of
these five aspects of voice. These practices or policies can facilitate productive
communication and mutual agreement between management and staff. However, if only
one part of the labor relationship is aware of the tool’s existence or views the tool as fair
and effective, opportunities are lost to improve the labor-management relationship as
well as teacher turnover. These lost opportunities may directly or indirectly contribute
to a teacher deciding to exit the program. For example, if the program is known to fairly
handle grievances and/or provide a clear picture of what the career and compensation
schedule entails, a teacher may see her options differently.
The presence and use of career lattices, formal grievance procedures or exit
interview protocols affect teacher-turnover rates; there is a statistically significant
difference between groups that agree the voice practice exists and those that agree it
does not (Groups I and IV). Also, if at least one person, director and/or teacher, reports
the existence and use of a career lattice or exit interviews (Groups I, II or III), turnover
means are almost half of turnover when both people agree no such voice practice is in
use.
At programs where the teacher thinks joint committees are not in use, the
difference in turnover is statistically significant, indicating that what the director reports
matters. This is true for exit interview results as well. On the other hand, when the
director says formal grievance procedures do not exist, it is what the teacher perceives
that is significant for low turnover rates.
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What the director reports does not matter when teachers perceive career lattices
in place, joint committees able to make change, or exit interviews conducted. It does not
matter how the director views staff meetings either if teachers think such meetings are
unproductive. In these four cases, teacher turnover rates are similar (within 3 percentage
points) regardless of the director’s response. These results indicate that as I proposed at
the beginning of this section, teacher’s feelings about voice are important. However, in
this small data set for each voice aspect, teachers’ feelings matter only under one set of
assumptions, either voice is perceived or voice is not perceived, and not both. A larger
data set might bridge this gap, showing that for some voice aspect, teachers’ views are
important in both scenarios.
I also hypothesized that teacher turnover is greatest among programs in Group
IV followed by turnover in Group II then Group III and finally Group I (Group IV > II
> III > I). This proved true for three voice practices: career lattices, grievance
procedures and exit interviews.
We all have had jobs where we agreed and/or disagreed with our boss on
policies and their effectiveness. The impact on the workplace by such perspectives can
be considerable. On average in this study, only 24 percent of the teachers disagree with
their director regarding the voice aspect in question. Therefore, for simplicity and
because it is more likely to reflect the program culture, I will use the directors’
responses henceforth.
Conclusion
Despite unionized staffs being responsible for fewer children on average, their
wages tend to be higher than non-unionized staff. If unionized teachers earn more and
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have fewer children in their charge, this may help to explain why their quit rates and
total turnover rates are lower. However, is the lower turnover due to the higher wages?
I found that the higher union wage does not dissipate the significance of unions
in relation to turnover. It could be argued that first workers need a union to get the
higher wage. Through collective bargaining, higher wages can be negotiated for staff.
Others might argue that if the wage were already high, union organizing would be less
successful. Longitudinal data could help to clarify this if it were available.
Unionization lowers turnover rates. Yet the evidence suggests that non-wage
factors such as lower staff ratios are also significant. In the next chapter, I use more
controls to assess this difference, looking at the presence or lack of aspects of voice in
different workplaces and under different regional employment conditions.
The results from the teacher and director agree-disagree study in this chapter
indicate that the presence and use of career lattices, formal grievance procedures and/or
exit interview protocols significantly affect teacher turnover. Also, where teachers think
they do not have good voice options, even if they actually do, some of their
dissatisfaction is seen in higher turnover rates. The result demonstrates that teachers’
perception of voice cannot be ignored when studying voluntary turnover. Further study
of voice practices continues in the next chapter.
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Notes
1

For a look at for-profit child care, see Brenda Bushouse.

2

My data set has enrollment numbers for each of the following categories:
Black or African American; Latino or Hispanic; Asian/Asian American/Pacific
Islander; American Indian/Alaskan Indian/Eskimo; biracial or multiracial. However
numbers in each category are small, so they are grouped together into one category,
non-European American, for the bulk of this analysis.
3

The Massachusetts health care reform law was enacted in 2006 mandating
nearly every resident obtains health insurance. The law established an independent
public authority, known as the Health Connector, to offer subsidized coverage and
facilitate the purchase of private insurance by individuals and small businesses.
However, the statute does not diminish the significant value (due to the practice of cost
sharing) of health insurance offered through employers.
4

There are no programs in the data set with turnover at one or two percent, or
between 44 and 50 percent.
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CHAPTER 6
SEARCHING FOR VOICE
The search for voice has led me to take a closer look at different programs and
their teacher turnover. Structured around the original research questions, this chapter
looks at working environments and practices within child-care programs.
I continue testing the theory that predicts lower turnover at programs where
workers have voice. Recall the definition, “voice” refers to the use of direct
communications to bring actual and desired conditions closer together (Hirschman
1970). The aspects and products of voice identified in my model of voice and exit in
figure 3.1 are formal grievance procedures, participation on decision-making
committees, regular paid staff meetings, performance reviews, and career and
compensation lattices or schedules. With or without unionization, these voice aspects
embody good management practices and an acknowledgement of the importance of
staff views and contributions. I predict these are integral to programs with low turnover.
Research Questions
The research questions are restated here.
•

What working conditions affect teacher turnover in ECE programs in the
private market?

•

How does “voice” differ in nature and quantity across different types of
workplaces?

•

What, if any, is the statistical relationship (correlation) between teacher
turnover and voice, and how does this relationship vary across types of
workplaces?

Below I explore each question. First I look at turnover and specific working
conditions (previously grouped together and called “voice”). Next I compare voice
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aspects in different types of workplaces. Lastly I query the possible relationship
between voice and turnover in different work sites.
Working Conditions and Turnover
When considering the factors that influence a worker’s decision to stay at their
job or to exit, the wage is only one, albeit a big one. Other conditions that may affect
the decision include benefits and the practical considerations identified in chapter 3.
I hypothesized that after accounting for wages, there are three working
conditions that are key to the presence and use of voice in the workplace. First, there is
evidence of consistent use of “voice” in a workplace with an agreed-upon policy for
solving grievances. Second, voice is evident in workplaces that utilize a career and
compensation lattice. Third, workplaces where decisions are made though management
and labor committees and meetings promote a culture of open communication. The
presence of these conditions reflects a positive management style and is characteristic of
programs with low teacher turnover.
Recall that the presence of each voice aspect is captured with a dummy variable
with a possible value of 0 for “not present” and 1 for “present and an integrated part of
the working environment.” The results in this chapter bear out my earlier hypothesis
that programs incorporating certain practices at their workplace have lower turnover.
Table 12 shows the percentage of programs reporting each voice aspect. (As in
chapter 5, exit interviews are used instead of performance reviews.) While the
percentage of union and non-union programs with each aspect are somewhat similar,
the differences in percentages are larger when looking at programs with two or more
voice aspects, as shown later in table 17. In table 12, exit interviews stand out as a
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disproportionately union practice. Likewise, committee participation is more often
reported in non-union programs, though the share of all programs that solicit committee
participation is relatively low in both union and non-union sites.
Table 12: Percentages of Programs with each Voice Aspect
VOICE ASPECT
Variable:
CBA
Career Lattices

% Non-union
Programs with
0%
80.6

% Union
Programs with
100 %
90.9

Union less Nonunion Difference
100 %
10.3

Grievance Procedures
Committee Participation

83.3
38.9

90.9
33.3

7.6
–5.6

Staff Meetings
Exit Interviews

88.9
50.0

93.9
66.7

5.0
16.7

In the next section, teacher turnover is regressed on the voice variables in a
single equation. While there is little variation among the programs with regard to the
use of voice aspects, the correlation matrix in table 13 and the contingency tables in
table 14 show that pair-wise correlation is low among the voice aspects in the data set.
My results described below allow the concern of multicollinearity be set aside.
Table 13: Correlation Matrix
PROGRAM Union

Lattice

Grievance Committee Meeting Exit Interview

Union

1.000

Lattice

0.147

1.000

Grievance

0.112

–0.037

1.000

Committee

–0.057

0.310

–0.066

1.000

Staff Meeting 0.090

–0.127

0.033

–0.088

1.000

Exit Interview 0.169

0.150

0.106

–0.152

0.050

1.000

Since the correlations are low and many programs have the same aspects, I also
determined the Pearson chi2 for each of the unique 15 voice-aspect pairs. Table 14
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shows the results for two of these variable pairs: A. Career lattices and Grievance
procedures; and B. Career lattices and Decision-making committees.
For each test, the null hypothesis is that programs with voice-aspect X and with
voice-aspect Y are independent, i.e., are not correlated (assuming aspect X is not the
same as aspect Y). The alternative hypothesis then is that they are bundled, i.e.,
dependent on each other, or are correlated.
Table 14: Two Contingency Tables
A.
Career lattices
No
Yes
Total

Grievance procedures
No
7
3
10

B.
Career lattices
No
Yes
Total

Yes
29
30
59

Total
36
33
69

Frequency
0.806
0.909
0.855

Decision-making committees
No
10
34
44

Yes
0
25
25

Total
10
59
69

Frequency
0.000
0.424
0.362

Contingency grid A. in table 14 above indicates that among programs without
career ladders, 80.6 percent have grievance procedures, and among programs with
career ladders, 90.9 percent have grievance-procedures. Are these correlated? When
comparing the observed frequencies with the expected frequencies, the Pearson chi2
(with one degree of freedom) equals 1.489 (Pr = 0.222). Therefore I fail to reject the
null hypothesis that they are independent, i.e. are not correlated.
I got similar pair-wise collinearity results (0.160 < Pr < 0.784) when I tested all
the voice-aspects pairs with one exception, career lattices and decision-making
committees. Contingency grid B. in table 14 shows that all of the programs without
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career ladders do not have decision-making committees, and among programs with
career ladders, 42.4 percent do have decision-making committees. In this case, when the
observed frequencies are compared with the expected frequencies, the Pearson chi2
(with one degree of freedom) equals 6.645 (Pr = 0.010). For this pair only, I reject the
null hypothesis. The frequency of programs with career lattices correlates with the
frequency of programs with decision-making committees. This is consistent with table
13, where this pair had the largest correlation (0.310) in the matrix.
In 14 out of 15 pairs, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the voice aspects are not
correlated. Overall the Pearson chi2 results do not contradict the low correlations shown
in table 13.
I also checked for multicollinearity among the six voice variables using variance
inflation factors (VIF). In all six regressions, the VIF values (1.026 < VIF < 1.206)
indicate that further consideration of multicollinearity is not warranted.
Unionization
I introduce Equation 6.1 below. In it, Y is the outcome variable, teacher
turnover, and i is the index for each of the 69 observations. β1 (beta one) is the
coefficient for programs with a signed CBA. It tells us the average change in the
outcome variable when the variable DCBA =1. β2 is the coefficient for programs with
career lattices. It tells us the average change in teacher turnover when there is a career
lattice, DLattice =1. β3, β4, β5, and β6 are the coefficients for the voice aspects grievance
procedures, decision-making committees, staff meetings, and exit interviews
respectively.
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Equation 6.1 (All programs i = 1 to 69)
Yi= β01+ β1DCBA+ β2DLattice + β3DGrievance+ β4DCommittee+ β5DMeeting+ β6DExitInterview+ ε
Each coefficient in table 15 represents the average change in teacher turnover
when said voice variable is equal to 1. The coefficients estimate the effect on turnover
of introducing a specific voice aspect. The table shows the direction of the effect for
each voice aspect, which aspects are significant, and compares aspects in union and
non-union workplaces.
Table 15: Turnover Regressed on Voice: Union Non-union Comparison

Variable
DCBA
DLadders
DGrievance
DCommittee
DMeetings
DExitInterview
Constant
Adj R2
n

Equation 6.1
Coefficient
t

Eq 6.2 Union
Coefficient

–0.048
(0.049)
–0.033
(0.074)
–0.124
(0.071)
–0.107
(0.053)
0.023
(0.085)
–0.100
(0.050)
0.488
(0.122)
0.108
69

0.086
(0.127)
0.040
(0.137)
0.046
(0.095)
0.119
(0.163)
–0.036
(0.083)
0.0004
(0.262)
-0.135
33

t

Eq 6.3 Non-union
Coefficient
t

–0.98
–0.44
–1.73*
–2.01**
0.27
–1.98*
4.00

0.68
0.29
0.48
0.73
–0.43
0.00

–0.090
(0.092)
–0.119
(0.090)
–0.162
(0.075)
0.005
(0.108)
–0.139
(0.066)
0.588
(0.152)
0.278
36

–0.98
–1.32
–2.16**
0.05
–2.09**
3.88

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant at **p<.05 level; *p<.10

With Equation 6.1, all the coefficients except staff meetings are negative,
indicating that the presence of that voice aspect is working in the desired direction,
toward lower turnover. Grievance procedures and exit interviews are statistically
significant at the 0.10 level, and decision-making committees are statistically significant
at the 0.05 level, all shown in table 15. The adjusted R-squared is 0.108.
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Equation 6.2 uses the 33 union-program observations (with a signed CBA) and
Equation 6.3 is for the 36 non-union observations. Equations 6.2 and 6.3 use the same
voice aspects as in Equation 6.1 except there is no CBA variable.
Equation 6.2 Union (i = 1 to 33)
Yi= β02+ β7DLattice + β8DGrievance+ β9DCommittee+ β10DMeeting+ β11DExitInterview + ε
Equation 6.3 Non-union (i = 1 to 36)
Yi= β03+ β12DLattice + β13DGrievance+ β14DCommittee+ β15DMeeting+ β16DExitInterview + ε
When turnover is regressed on the variables in Equation 6.2, no variables are
statistically significant. Recall from figure 4, the distribution range of turnover rates
among union programs was nearly half that among non-union programs. Also, because
the percentage of union programs that utilize voice aspects is high, there is less
variability in the independent variables, as seen in table 12. With low variability in the
dependent and independent variables, Equation 6.2 is unlikely to produce statistically
significant results.
However, when turnover is regressed on voice aspects in the non-union data set
using Equation 6.3, decision-making committees and exit interviews are statistically
significant at the 0.05 level (see table 15). The coefficients indicate the effect on
turnover that might be expected if a non-union program were to add a specific voice
practice. With more to explain due to greater variability among the variables, the
adjusted R-squared for Equation 6.3 (non-union) is the highest in table 15 at 0.278.
Having looked at the three equations, now I focus on each voice variable within
the equations.
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Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
A signed CBA can be seen as a proxy for union status. A CBA comes out of a
process of negotiation where labor representatives and management communicate
directly. This process can give workers a say in their work environment even before
agreement is reached. These agreements cover areas such as hiring, seniority, time off,
discrimination, disability access, committee structure, job requirements, wages, benefits
and more. Many of the aspects of voice I am studying are typically part of a CBA. With
Equation 6.1, the CBA is associated with a 4.8 percent reduction in turnover (table 15).
All these unionized programs have a CBA. Contracts or agreements between
management and labor are rare in non-union shops, and none of my non-union
observations have such agreements.
Career and Compensation Lattices
Career and compensation lattices, also called ladders, are used to determine the
wage of a new hire and what workers must do to earn a promotion and/or wage
increase. These types of lattices (common at government work sites, for example) are
reported in 80.6 percent of the non-union and 90.9 percent of the union programs (table
12). For non-union programs with career lattices, the effect is an average reduction in
teacher turnover of 9 percentage points (from the constant), as shown on the right-hand
side of table 15. Having the information contained on career lattices available to all staff
does work in the desired direction (toward lower turnover), but it is not statistically
significant, contrary to my hypothesis.
The constant (β0-) represents the expected rate of teacher turnover when all the
other variables in the equation are zero. All the observations in Equation 6.2 have a
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CBA. That equation’s constant is much smaller than the others, most likely because all
programs with a CBA in the data set have at least two voice aspects.
Grievance Procedures
Over 80 percent of programs report using some type of formal grievance
procedure. These procedures are intended to provide a recognized and consistent
treatment of grievance accusations and are associated with an 11.9 percentage-point
reduction in turnover in non-union programs (table 15). For union programs, the
coefficient for this variable is 0.040 (4 percentage points) but is not statistically
significant.
It is not possible to know if on average grievance procedures in non-union
programs are similar in terms and conditions as such procedures in union programs,
which are publicly reviewed at least during contract renewals. One non-union teacher
wrote in her survey, “Our problems are more with getting problems resolved through
our directors.”
Empowered Committee Participation
Committees with both staff and managers can be a place where worker voice is
expressed with colleagues and management. Of all the voice aspects being studied, this
one is reported in the fewest programs, approximately one-third of each workplace type
in table 12. However, the coefficient for active participation on committees in nonunion programs is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and indicates an expected
reduction in turnover of 16.2 percent. This coefficient for all programs (Equation 6.1)
with empowered committee participation is also statistically significant at the same
level.
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Staff Meetings
Staff meetings regularly scheduled during paid time and considered productive
are common, taking place in 94 percent of union programs and 89 percent of non-union
programs (table 12). The small positive coefficient estimate for staff meetings in nonunion programs implies that using only staff meetings is not associated with lower
teacher turnover rates in these programs. Perhaps responders feel there are too many
staff meetings, or the meetings are not productive, and/or are not taken seriously.
Regardless of which set of observations are used, the coefficient for staff meetings
remains positive and is not statistically significant.
Exit Interviews
Though not as common as most of the other voice aspects, table 12 shows that
exit interviews are conducted regularly in half of the non-union work sites and in twothirds of the unionized work sites, a 16.7 percent difference. As discussed in chapter 5,
an exit interview happens after a worker has decided to leave. However, the program’s
practice of collecting this information can indicate that management seeks and receives
“direct communication” which they may later use “to bring actual and desired
conditions closer together,” the definition of voice. The coefficient in each of the three
equations is negative, indicating the practice appears to work in the desired direction.
There is an estimated 13.9 percentage-point reduction in teacher turnover associated
with non-union programs that conduct exit interviews. This reduction is both
statistically and economically significant.
In Equation 6.2, only the coefficient for the exit interview variable is negative,
indicating a reduction in turnover of 3.6 percentage points in union programs, though
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this result is not statistically significant. Not all CBAs require the practice of conducting
exit interviews when a staff member leaves, so there may be more variability among
union programs in this independent variable than with other voice aspects.
Which working conditions?
This section began by asking what working conditions affect teacher turnover in
child-care programs. Recall that I hypothesized that an agreed-upon policy for solving
grievances, a career and compensation lattice, and decisions made though management
and labor committees are evidence of the presence and use of voice and are present in
programs with low teacher turnover. The results show that when teacher turnover is
regressed on voice aspects, grievance procedures and empowered committee
participation are statistically significant. While career lattices are not found to be
significant, exit-interview protocols are. In the complete data set, committee
participation and exit interviews are associated with a reduction of 10.7 and 10
percentage points in teacher turnover respectively. Among non-union programs, the
average reduction in turnover is greater, 16.2 and 13.9 percentage points respectively.
The use of committee participation and exit interviews protocols is representative of
programs with lower teacher turnover. Implementation of these voice aspects may aid in
lowering turnover.
Table 15 sheds light on the relationship between voice and turnover in these
workplaces. The small constant in Equation 6.2 may indicate that the driving force in
the expected value of the outcome variable, teacher turnover is the program’s
unionization status rather than the program culture including a specific aspect of voice.
Therefore it seems reasonable to expect that the coefficients in Equation 6.2 do not
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further reduce the outcome variable, since a union contract (CBA) typically covers the
use of career and compensation ladders, grievance procedures, committee integration
and staff meetings, as well as decreases the variability among this group.
Location of Workplaces
My second research question asks how voice differs in nature and quantity
across different types of workplaces. I’m looking for which aspects of voice are in use,
and which workplaces adopt which variants. Part of the answer to this question has been
discussed and shown in the tables above. In chapter 3, I proposed that there is more
evidence of consistent use of voice by workers and management in unionized programs.
The comparison between union and non-union programs in the previous section
indicates that there is more voice in union programs through the signed CBA.
What about other types of work sites? While there are many different types of
workplaces, I choose to compare the use of voice in different geographical locations
grouped by regional unemployment because this is an exogenous factor with which all
programs must deal.
Regional Unemployment
The unemployment rate represents the number of unemployed persons as a
percentage of the regional labor force.1 This seems a useful comparison, since
unemployment rates can affect how workers see their prospects in the job market. High
unemployment in the area, external to a program’s work environment, can be a
discouragement to quitting. Therefore teacher turnover is expected to be lower in a
high-unemployment market than in a tighter labor market.
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As described in chapter 4, Massachusetts is divided into six geographic regions.
The regions in order from 1 to 6 are: Western, Central, Northeast, Metro West,
Southeast and Boston, as shown in figure 2. Unfortunately these regions do not
correspond to standard geographic and statistical groupings used by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics to calculate unemployment rates. The unemployment rates within
EOHHS regions, ranging from 4.2 to 7.2 percent, are so different that EOHHS regions
are not a useful basis for a comparison of unemployment rates within Massachusetts.
Instead, each child-care program’s county, and metropolitan New England City
and Town Area (NECTA), if appropriate, were used to determine the corresponding
unemployment rate for its area in September 2003, when the survey was conducted.2
When comparing all the relevant unemployment rates, there was a clear break around
5.9 percent. Therefore I have grouped together programs in areas with an
unemployment rate of 5.9 percent or greater as the “high-unemployment group.” There
are more programs in this group (n=43) than in the “low-unemployment group” which
tend to be located in non-urban areas. Programs in the high-unemployment group are
located in the counties of Hampden (includes the city of Springfield), Worcester, Essex,
Bristol (includes New Bedford), and Suffolk (Boston), and the city of Cambridge in
Middlesex County.3 Programs in areas with an unemployment rate of less than 5.9
percent are in my low-unemployment group (n=26). These programs are in the rest of
Middlesex county as well as in the counties of Berkshire, Hampshire, Norfolk,
Plymouth, and Barnstable (includes Hyannis on Cape Cod).
When comparing programs in high- and low-unemployment regions, correlation
is weak among the voice aspects in the data set, as it is when comparing programs by
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union status. Similar to Equation 6.1 studied earlier, each coefficient in Equation 6.4
represents the expected average change in teacher turnover when that voice variable is
equal to 1. However, the union-status variable is replaced in Equation 6.4 with DRHigh,
representing regional unemployment group. Therefore the coefficient β1 (beta one) tells
us the expected change in the dependent variable, teacher turnover, when the
independent variable DRHigh =1 for programs in the high-unemployment group. Since a
region with high unemployment indicates there are more people chasing fewer jobs, we
expect teacher turnover to be lower than if the same program were in a region with
lower unemployment.
Equation 6.4 (All programs i = 1 to 69)
Yi= β04+ β1DRHigh+ β2DLattice + β3DGrievance+ β4DCommittee+ β5DMeeting+ β6DExitInterview+ ε
When teacher turnover is regressed on the variables in Equation 6.4 using all the
program surveys returned by directors, DRHigh and DExitInterview are statistically
significant, as shown in table 16. The adjusted R-squared is 0.207 (higher than for
Equation 6.1 with the CBA variable). The constant, β04 is 52.2 percent, as shown in the
left column of table 16. This represents the expected rate of teacher turnover for
programs in a low-unemployment region (written as nR) without any voice aspects
(written as nX):
E (Y | nR nX). It is the highest constant in table 16 supporting the expectation that
turnover is higher in a low-unemployment climate. (This is above state and national
averages discussed in previous chapters. However state and national child-care turnover
averages are calculated over time and do not include information about corresponding
economic conditions.)
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Equation 6.5 uses the 26 program observations in the low-unemployment
regions and Equation 6.6 uses the 43 observations in the high-unemployment regions.
Sorted by unemployment group, both equations use the same voice variables as
Equation 6.4.
Equation 6.5 Low unemployment (i = 1 to 26)
Yi= β05+ β7DLattice + β8DGrievance+ β9DCommittee+ β10DMeeting+ β11DExitInterview + ε
Equation 6.6 High unemployment (i = 1 to 43)
Yi= β06+ β12DLattice + β13DGrievance+ β14DCommittee+ β15DMeeting+ β16DExitInterview + ε
Of course, the regional labor market affects voluntary and involuntary labor
turnover, and this is confirmed in table 16 with the statistically significant coefficient (at
the 0.01 level) for DRHigh. The coefficient, β1 when DRHigh =1 and all other variables are
zero indicates a 14.5 percentage-point decrease in teacher turnover for being located in
a region experiencing high-unemployment, an element external to the program’s
control. While high unemployment is generally undesirable, it affords lower turnover
because teachers see few job opportunities elsewhere. Given this external effect on exit,
does the use of voice differ for programs forced to operate under different market
realities?
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Table 16: Turnover Regressed on Voice: Regional Unemployment Comparison

Variable
DRHigh
DLadders
DGrievance
DCommittee
DMeetings
DExitInterview
Constant
Adj R2
n

Equation 6.4
Eq.6.5 Low-unemployment
Coefficient t
Coefficient
t
–0.145
–2.97***
(0.049)
–0.059
–0.86
0.117
0.89
(0.069)
(0.130)
–0.102
–1.51
0.002
0.02
(0.068)
(0.113)
–0.063
–1.21
–0.196
–1.82*
(0.052)
(0.108)
0.035
0.44
0.086
0.61
(0.080)
(0.140)
–0.082
–1.73*
–0.249
–2.80**
(0.048)
(0.089)
0.522
4.52
0.359
1.76
(0.116)
(0.204)
0.207
0.202
69
26

Eq.6.6High-unemply
Coefficient
t

–0.163
(0.070)
–0.135
(0.079)
0.027
(0.053)
–0.002
(0.091)
0.044
(0.048)
0.413
(0.134)
0.115
43

–2.32**
–1.72*
0.50
–0.03
0.92
3.07

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant at ***p<.01 level; **p<.05 level; *p<.10

Career and Compensation Schedules or Lattices
As mentioned earlier, compensation ladders are used to determine the wage and
rank of employees. Among the high-unemployment group, the coefficient estimate for a
program reporting use of such a ladder is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and is
associated with an average reduction in turnover of 16.3 percentage points (right-hand
side of table 16). While management may appear to have the upper hand in a highunemployment market, both sides of the labor relationship bear costs. For example, on
National Public Radio’s All Things Considered, Laurie Bienstock of Watson Wyatt
Worldwide stated that over time replacing staff is three times more expensive than
keeping existing workers4.
By contrast, the coefficients for career lattices, grievance procedures and staff
meetings are positive and not statistically significant in the low-unemployment group.
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This indicates that under favorable employment conditions for workers, these voice
aspects are not associated with teacher turnover.
Grievance Procedures
Focusing on Equation 6.4, fair and consistent use of established grievance
procedures is estimated to lower teacher turnover by 10.2 percentage points, though it is
not statistically significant. However, with annual turnover in child-care programs of 30
percent reported, a 10 percentage-point reduction is economically significant.
In the high-unemployment group, the coefficient estimate for formal grievance
procedures is negative 13.5 (second highest reduction) and statistically significant at the
0.10 level. Programs with this process in place, as with the career lattice, benefit from
lower turnover and a more stable workforce at their programs.
Empowered Committee Participation
Programs that utilize committees with a mix of staff and management to make
workplace decisions can be a method for people to communicate across hierarchical
lines. The negative coefficient of 6.3 percentage points for the practice of inclusive and
empowered committees (Equation 6.4) is associated in this data set with a desirable
effect on turnover. Also note that the coefficient for this variable in Equation 6.5
(consisting of observations in low-unemployment regions only) is associated with a
larger reduction in turnover, 19.6 percentage points, and is statistically significant at the
0.10 level. Thus even when teachers view their external job prospects as good,
implementing this practice may prove beneficial to managers who hope to deter
teachers’ voluntary departures.
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Staff Meetings
The positive coefficient estimate of 3.5 percent for productive staff meetings on
the left side of table 16 implies that this voice aspect is associated with a small though
undesirable increase in turnover. Consistent with the coefficients shown in table 15,
staff meetings are not associated with lower turnover in this data. As discussed earlier,
the view of what is productive varies, and these meetings may be perceived as a waste
of time.
Exit Interviews
Conducting exit interviews when a staff person leaves provides feedback to
management and an opportunity to reconsider what may or may not be working at the
workplace. The overall negative coefficient of 8.2 percent is statistically significant at
the 0.10 level. Using Equation 6.5, the expected change in teacher turnover among
programs in the low-unemployment group that conduct exit interviews is a 24.9
percentage-point reduction (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). This practice
among programs facing a competitive employment market is associated with the largest
decrease in average turnover of the independent variables in table 16. Likewise, recall
that in non-union programs, exit interviews are statistically significant and associated
with the second largest reduction in turnover (table 15). This is interesting, because exit
interviews often are not viewed as an opportunity for workers and management to
communicate; yet the practice in these different workplaces seems to reduce voluntary
exits.
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Different Environment, Different Response
Unemployment matters, and it appears that the use of voice aspects vary in
different labor market conditions. For example, if management is facing a competitive
employment market and unable to raise wages, my results suggest that empowered
committee participation and exit interview protocols are worth considering in order to
retain teachers. On the other hand, in a region with high-unemployment, career and
compensation ladders and grievance procedures are associated with lower teacher
turnover. In a market with many job seekers, these voice aspects are associated with
reductions in turnover larger than for any of the other voice aspects tested. This may be
because in a region with high unemployment, a career lattice and formal grievance
procedures are tangible and measurable practices that can affect wages and/or titles over
time. Whereas in regions with low unemployment, wages may be competitive across
programs, and therefore workplace culture and daily practices such as decision-making
committees and exit interview practices play an important role in distinguishing
programs. Detailed wage data over time could clarify this.
Decision-making committees and exit interviews are associated with lowturnover programs in both workplace comparisons when turnover is often high, i.e.,
among non-union programs or in regions with low-unemployment. As shown earlier in
table 15, the use of empowered committees or exit interviews in programs without a
CBA is associated with the largest reductions in teacher turnover. While these two voice
aspects are not associated with lowering turnover for programs in the highunemployment group, they are associated with statistically significant turnover
reductions for programs in the low-unemployment group.
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More is better
This section began with a focus on my second research question: how voice
differs in nature and quantity across different types of workplaces. The above
comparisons show that there is difference in the use, or nature of voice in different
workplaces. What about quantity?
Recall that I proposed that there is more evidence of consistent use of voice by
workers and management in unionized programs. Table 17 is a summary of the number,
or quantity of voice practices and associated turnover-rate distributions by unionization
status. Union shops report more aspects or practices of voice than non-union shops. For
example, 72.7 percent of union programs report 4-5 voice practices in use compared to
only 52.8 percent of non-union shops.
Table 17: Turnover Distribution by Quantity of Voice Aspects

Aspects
Programs
n
n
ALL PROGRAMS
69
0-1
0
2-3
26
4-5
43
NON-UNION
36
0-1
0
2-3
17
4-5
19
UNION
33
0-1
0
2-3
9^
4-5
24

Percent of
programs

st

1
quartile

TURNOVER Percent
2nd
3rd
quartile
quartile

4th
quartile

100.00 %
0
37.68
62.32

11.44 %
0
18.18
9.09

20.00 %
0
34.85
14.29

36.93 %
0
50.00
25.00

100.00%
0
100.00
63.64

100.00
0
47.22
52.78

14.29
0
25.00
9.09

22.25
0
40.00
14.29

40.00
0
57.61
21.43

100.00
0
100.00
40.00

100.00
0
27.27
72.73

6.90
0
3.57
7.27

17.39
0
25.00
16.20

30.95
0
32.47
31.25

63.64
0
42.86
63.64

Note: ^Given the small number of observations (9), these quartile estimates may not be accurate.
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Another pattern that emerges from table 17 is that with more voice practices,
turnover rates for both union and non-union programs are lower at most points in the
distribution and consistently at the 2nd and 3rd quartile. For example, in the 2nd quartile
the turnover rate for non-union programs with 2-3 (few) voice practices is 40 percent
while for programs with 4-5 (several) voice practices, the turnover rate is quite a bit
less, 14.29 percent. This is a large difference between programs in the low verses high
voice-practices categories. The addition of one or two voice practices reduces the
turnover rate by more than half. At the first quartile for non-union programs for
example, turnover goes from 25 percent to 9.09 percent, a 64 percent drop, with the
addition of a fourth voice practice.
Nearly three-quarters of the union programs report 4-5 voice practices in use.
While the size of the decrease in turnover for non-union programs is larger across the
distribution when going from the “few” group (2-3) to “several” (4-5) voice practices,
the small number of union programs (9) that report 2-3 aspects begin with much lower
turnover than non-union programs reporting 2-3 aspects. The patterns that emerge from
table 17 provide strong evidence for my hypothesis that voice is more common in
unionized programs.
Relationship between Turnover and Voice
The final research question asks what the statistical relationship (correlation)
between teacher turnover and voice is, and how this relationship may vary across
workplaces.
I proposed that there is a negative relationship between turnover and voice. As
aspects of voice in the workplace increase, teacher turnover decreases. Table 17 showed
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this to be true from a simple counting approach but says nothing about the statistical
relationships. In chapter 3, I proposed three aspects or products of voice are present
when teacher turnover is lower than the state’s industry average: a signed CBA; a
formal grievance procedure; and a career and compensation lattice or schedule. As has
been shown, career lattices are not significant with regard to turnover in this data set.
However, both the CBA and grievance procedure practices seem promising for further
analysis.
Effects of Voice, Union status and Wages
Table 18 reports the results of nine OLS specifications where the dependent
variable is the teacher turnover rate and the independent variables are union status,
teacher average wage, unemployment and three aspects of voice that stand out from
earlier analyses. These specifications expand on those in table 9 by including
unemployment and voice. (I have included the results of specifications 1, 2 and 3 from
table 9 in table 18 for reference.)
Voice
Specification 4 of table 18 is a multivariate regression of the turnover rate on
three aspects of voice without controls for the confounding effects of union status, wage
or unemployment. These voice variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or
better. The coefficients indicate a negative relationship to turnover. For example, the
coefficient estimate for grievance procedures is associated with a decrease in teacher
turnover of 16.9 percentage points when controlling for other aspects of voice.
Grievance procedures consistently show the most significant effect of all the
independent variables tested in table 18.
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Union status and Voice
Specification 5 is a regression of teacher turnover on union status and the same
aspects of voice, allowing a test of whether lower turnover is related to union status
when including voice. This coefficient for union status, though not statistically
significant, indicates that unionization is associated with a decrease in teacher turnover
of 6.2 percentage points. There is little change between specifications 4 and 5 in the
statistically significant voice coefficients.
Wage and Voice
Specification 6 is similar to specification 5 except it replaces union status with
teacher average wage, regressing turnover on wage and voice. The voice coefficients
vary little and remain statistically significant. The wage coefficient indicates a small
effect on turnover of roughly one percentage-point per dollar of wage regardless of
regression, i.e., specifications 2, 3, 6, 8, or 9.
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Table 18: Regressions of Turnover on Union, Wage, Unemployment and Voice
Specifications
from Table 9
VARIABLE
UNION
STATUS
AVERAGE
WAGE
Adjusted
R<2>
Specification

VARIABLE
UNION
STATUS
AVERAGE
WAGE

[2]

[3]

--

–0.086
(0.045)*

--

0.006
(0.012)

0.008
(0.012)

0.036

–0.012

0.029

[1]
Est. Coef.
(Std. Error)
–0.083
(0.044)*

[4]

[5]

Est. Coef.
(Std. Error)
-–0.062
(0.041)
--

--

[6]

[7]

--

--

–0.068
(0.041)

–0.046
(0.041)

--

0.016
(0.011)

0.016
(0.011)

–0.104
(0.043)**

--

–0.094
(0.044)**

0.014
(0.011)

-HIGH
--UNEMPLOYMENT
GRIEVANCE –0.169
–0.160 –0.182
PROCEDURE (0.061)*** (0.061)** (0.062)***

[8]

[9]

–0.148
–0.174
–0.158
(0.060)** (0.061)*** (0.060)**

DECISION
–0.094
–0.096
–0.101
–0.068
COMMITTEE (0.043)** (0.043)** (0.043)** (0.043)

–0.104
–0.080
(0.043)** (0.043)*

EXIT
–0.093
–0.083
–0.093
–0.077
–0.083
–0.073
INTERVIEW (0.042)** (0.042)* (0.042)** (0.041)* (0.042)* (0.041)*
Adjusted
R<2>

0.167

0.183

0.174

0.226

Notes: Results are not weighted. n=69
Significant at ***p<.01 level; **p<.05 level; *p<.10 level
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0.196

0.240

Unemployment and Voice
Specification 7 replaces union status with unemployment group, regressing
turnover on unemployment and voice. The unemployment coefficient indicates that
operating in a high unemployment area is associated with a 10.4 percentage-point
decrease in turnover when controlling for voice. Only in this specification is one of the
voice aspects not statistically significant.
Union, Wage and Voice
Specification 8 regresses turnover on union status controlling for average wage
and three aspects of voice. The coefficients for union status and wage are similar to
those in specifications 5 and 6, showing that when wage is included the associated
effect of union status on turnover changes less than one percentage point (–6.2 to –6.8).
Again, all the voice aspects are statistically significant with grievance procedures
associated with a 17.4 percentage-point reduction in turnover even when controlling for
the other effects.
Union, Wage, Unemployment and Voice
Specification 9 regresses turnover on all variables listed in table 18. The
unemployment group, grievance procedures, committees and exit interviews are each
statistically significant. With coefficient estimates between –7.3 and –15.8 percentage
points, the voice aspects are associated with desirable reductions in teacher turnover
even when controlling for unionization, wage and unemployment climate.
Recall the regression results in table 9 (shown again in table 18, specifications 1
through 3) that used the same dependent variable with union status and teacher average
wage as the only independent variables. Specification 3 indicated that when controlling
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for wages, union status was statistically significant and associated with an 8.6
percentage-point reduction in turnover per dollar of wage (t = –1.94). When controlling
for voice in specification 5, union status losses some of its effect and significance (t = –
1.51). This may be due to the CBA, which as noted earlier typically incorporates
aspects of voice. When also controlling for wages and unemployment as in specification
9, the union effect is still associated with a 4.6 percentage-point reduction in turnover (t
= –1.10). Unionization lowers turnover rates, but as the evidence suggested in the
previous chapter, other factors are also significant.
I acknowledge that some of the coefficients for union status are below
conventional levels of statistical significance. However, a 4.6 percentage-point
reduction is economically desirable in this market, considering Massachusetts’ ECE
teacher turnover rates are typically 29 percent annually regardless of unemployment
rates. A reduction of nearly 5 percentage points is a measurable difference for these
programs and offers a way to lower turnover.
Conclusion
This chapter looked at different program types, voice, and relationships to
teacher turnover. Many programs utilize the voice aspects tested, with more than 80
percent reporting career lattices, formal grievance procedures, or paid staff meetings as
part of program policy (shown in table 12). Exit interviews stand out as a
disproportionately union practice while the less common joint committee participation
is more often reported in non-union programs.
Work practices do affect teacher-turnover rates in child-care programs. When
turnover is regressed on voice aspects, grievance procedures, empowered committee
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participation and exit interviews are statistically significant. Committee participation
and exit interviews are associated with desirable reductions in turnover, especially
among non-union programs and programs in a region with low unemployment.
It is clear that voice differs across workplaces. Geographically comparing
programs based on regional unemployment rates produced some interesting results.
Contrary to the results found in regions with low-unemployment, career lattices and
grievance procedures are associated with low-teacher turnover in regions with highunemployment where there are typically more applicants than job openings.
Union shops report more aspects or practices of voice than non-union shops.
Results indicate that with more voice practices, turnover rates for both union and nonunion programs are lower.
Some non-union work sites adopt individual aspects of voice through good
management policies. Career and compensation lattices are the second most reported
voice aspect by union programs and the third most reported by non-union programs (see
table 12). Perhaps the high use of this voice practice (and others) inhibits the ability to
separate them from the effects of a CBA, which builds in many voice aspects.
Finally, I find a negative statistical relationship between labor’s voice
alternatives to quitting and turnover. When controlling for voice and wages, the
associated effect of union status is a 6.8 percentage point reduction in teacher turnover.
In a high-turnover industry, many managers would welcome this reduction in exchange
for allowing their workers some voice. Even when also considering a high
unemployment climate, the associated effect of union status is 4.6 percentage points in
the desired direction.
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The education literature tells us lower turnover improves the quality of
education and care received by children, and provides numerous future social and
economic benefits. My results add to the literature that identifies improved
compensation as crucial to lowering turnover by showing that working conditions are
relevant to turnover rates. Labor-management agreements, joint committee participation
and exit interviews can improve turnover rates, benefiting teachers, programs and
children. In the next and final chapter, I’ll consider my results in a broader context.
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Notes
1

Unemployed persons are defined as 16 years and older who had no
employment during the reference week, were available for work, except for temporary
illness, and had made specific efforts to find employment sometime during the 4-week
period ending with the reference week. Persons who were waiting to be recalled to a job
from which they had been laid off need not have been looking for work to be classified
as unemployed.
2

U.S. Department of Labor, Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Massachusetts, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?la+25 The regional labor area
unemployment measures are not seasonally adjusted. The Metropolitan NECTA (New
England City and Town Area) classification is considered more accurate for
Massachusetts than the MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) classification. For county
unemployment rates see:
http://data.bls.gov/map/servlet/map.servlet.MapToolServlet?state=25&datatype=unemp
loyment&year=2003&period=M09&survey=la&map=county&seasonal=u
3

Counties with ECE observations in EOHHS Region 1: Berkshire, Hampshire,
Hampden; Region 2: Worcester, Norfolk; Region 3: Essex, Middlesex; Region 4:
Middlesex, Plymouth, Norfolk; Region 5 Bristol, Plymouth, Barnstable; Region 6:
Suffolk.
4

All Things Considered, “Some Companies Stay Firm To No-Layoffs Pledge,”
January 9, 2009. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=99175009
(audio accessed July 3, 2009).
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CHAPTER 7
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND A POSSIBLE FUTURE

Parents can’t afford to pay,
Teachers and providers can’t afford to stay,
Help us find a better way
(Worthy Wage Campaign Jingle, 1992).

In this chapter I review my findings and the project’s contributions, discuss
lessons learned, detail some recent developments, and close with future possibilities.
Summary of Empirical Findings
Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice and loyalty demonstrates how workers
or members of a group can draw attention to problems and initiate processes to solve
them. In the private sector when workers are unionized, voice is a group of established
mechanisms for workers and management to communicate directly about working
issues, usually specified in a collective bargaining agreement. In child-care programs
that are not unionized, human resource and management policies may provide
opportunities for voice.
The aspects of voice I studied in this dissertation are:
CBAs that require negotiations with representatives from both sides of the labor
relationship;
Grievance and arbitration procedures that formalize a process for appealing
supervisor decisions and demands;
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Committees and meetings structured to include and empower both labor and
management to seek solutions cooperatively;
Exit interviews conducted by management to inform future decisions; and
Career lattices that describe clear advancement opportunities and rewards for
commitment and skill improvements.
My model of voice and exit (figure 3.1) identifies connections between these
aspects of voice, union status and/or management policies, compensation and turnover.
Program-level
My Massachusetts results indicate that compared to non-union programs,
unionized programs:
Employ more staff per child;
Pay higher wages;
Serve a higher percentage of state-subsidized children; and
Have lower rates of turnover.
Less than 15 percent of union programs experienced turnover in 2003 greater
than the state’s industry average of 29 percent, compared to nearly 40 percent of the
non-union programs. Union quit rates averaged nearly half that of non-union programs
(11.4 percent vs. 20.5 percent). This difference in quit rates and total turnover rates are
both statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Hypotheses
Results drawn from the ECE director and teacher surveys confirmed my
hypotheses, with one exception.
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1. The presence and type of worker voice is associated with turnover rates in
ECE programs.
When turnover is regressed on voice aspects in the data set, grievance
procedures, joint committee participation and exit interview protocols are statistically
significant. Among non-union programs, joint committee participation and exit
interviews are statistically significant and associated with desirable reductions in
turnover. This is true for programs in regions with low unemployment as well. When
turnover is regressed on voice controlling for union status and the wage, grievance
procedures, joint committee participation and exit interviews are statistically significant.
Contrary to my hypothesis, career lattices are only statistically significant in this
analysis for programs in high-unemployment regions, where turnover is suppressed
already by exogenous factors.
2. There is more voice in unionized than in non-unionized programs, with 73
percent of unionized programs reporting four or more voice practices in use compared
to only 53 percent of non-union programs as shown in table 17. My results indicate that
as the number of voice practices increases, turnover rates decrease for all programs. In
addition, the aspects of voice that are significant to turnover vary depending on the
current exogenous employment conditions for the program.
I found that both non-union programs and programs in low-unemployment
regions have higher turnover than their comparison group. Even in a tight labor market,
ECE wages may vary little across programs. In this case, it is unlikely that management
can stop teachers leaving the ECE field (referred to as occupational turnover).
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However, program culture and daily practices such as joint decision-making
committees and exit interviews can play an important role in distinguishing programs.
As such, the use of voice may help managers keep their teachers from jumping to
another position within the ECE field (job turnover). Data on where teachers go when
they leave could provide a basis for refining this explanation.
In regions with high unemployment, career lattices and formal grievance
procedures are associated with relatively large reductions in turnover compared to the
other voice aspects I tested. Career lattices and formal grievance procedures are tangible
and measurable practices that can affect wages and/or job titles over time. These
policies help create a positive program climate that counters the negative atmosphere
typical when there are more job seekers than job openings.
3. I found a statistically significant negative relationship between turnover and
voice that varied little across types of ECE workplaces.
When I regressed turnover on three aspects of voice (grievance procedures, joint
committees and exit interviews) without controls for the effects of union status or wage,
coefficients for all three voice variables indicated a statistically significant negative
relationship to turnover at the 0.05 level or better.
When turnover is regressed on union status controlling for wages, the higher
union average wage does not dissipate the significance of unions, yet the evidence
suggests non-wage factors also play a role. When controlling for both wage and the
three aspects of voice significant above, voice remains statistically significant, and the
associated effect of union status is a 6.8 percentage-point reduction in turnover. While
not statistically significant, I believe ECE managers would welcome a nearly seven
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percentage-point reduction in exchange for allowing more worker voice, given the
typical levels of turnover (and turmoil) to which they are accustomed.
Agreement between Labor and Management?
In addition to these three hypotheses, I explored the issue of labor-management
disagreements. Surveying both sides of the labor relationship gave me a better picture of
working conditions at a program. It also gave me an opportunity to compare the rate of
disagreement in these relationships. Overall, when responses from a director and
teacher at the same program are compared, the teachers report the presence and
effective use of voice aspects less than directors. If at least the director or teacher
reports the use of a voice aspect, turnover is lower, though not always significantly,
than when they agree there is no voice (Group IV), for all aspects except staff meetings.
The differences in turnover rates between director-teacher matches that agree
either a career lattice, formal grievance procedures or exit interview protocols exist, and
those that agree the aspect does not, are statistically significant and indicate these
practices are associated with lower turnover. When in disagreement, turnover is lower
when the teacher perceives there is voice than when the teacher sees no voice.
I found that what the director states does not matter with regard to turnover rates
when their teacher perceives career lattices in place, joint committees able to make
change, or exit interviews conducted. Also, if the teacher thinks staff meetings are
unproductive, the director’s view on these meetings matters not to turnover outcomes.
With these four aspects of voice, teacher turnover rates are similar (within 3 percentage
points) regardless of director response.
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Where employee dissatisfaction is high, for whatever reason, perception of voice
is low. Some of this dissatisfaction is seen in higher turnover rates. These results
support my premise in chapter 5 that employees’ feelings about work are important and
need to be considered, especially when studying voluntary-turnover issues.
My focus on voice and its relationship to turnover contributes to a better
understanding of where and why turnover rates differ in ECE workplaces. These
findings provide methods and practices worth considering to reduce turnover rates. The
results are relevant and informative to economists and others beyond the academic
community. State and federal policy-makers and child-care professionals are invited to
use these findings and consider workers more in their organizing and policy analyses.
Methodological Lessons
This dissertation taught me a lot, as it should. Next time I conduct such a project
there are some things I will do differently. With regard to sampling, matching nonunion and union programs by size and legal status (type) as well as geography would
produce a better comparison group than the geographic matching done here.
Another concern is response rates. While critical to both legitimacy and results, I
would spend less time collecting data since after the second month, the marginal benefit
(receipt of another survey) did not equate to the marginal costs in time or money of an
additional observation. I could not survey more unionized programs since my union
sample was the population. However I could increase the non-union sample though it
would reduce the union percentage in the data set and naturally increase costs.
What I learned in the process of cleaning and coding the data will significantly
improve the timeliness and detail of future research. More enlightened decisions
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concerning variable coding and indices creation, for example, will enhance future
analysis and elucidate outcomes.
Other research has demonstrated, and conventional wisdom supports, that wages
are significant to the hiring and retention of workers. However, in my results this is not
borne out. Recall from table 18 that the coefficients for wages are 1.6 percentage points
or less, indicating practically no effect on turnover rates. This is a conundrum.
My wage variable is the mean of each programs’ average wage for teachers.
This variable does not do a good job of explaining turnover. There is a lot of variation
in wages within and across programs. The variable does not capture differences in the
range of teachers’ wages or distinguish the implications of a wage distribution tied to
years of service. While the survey asked for high, average and starting wage levels for
teachers, it did not ask how many teachers were in each category, or the wages of those
who quit or those who have been at the program for many years. Also many directors
did not provide the three wage levels for each staff position. The difference in average
wage for union teachers and non-union teachers in this data set is only $0.42 per hour
(table 6). The difference in average wages of those quitting and those remaining at a
given program could be greater than this. Therefore, my wage variable is probably not a
good proxy for testing the significance of teachers’ wages on turnover among these
programs. I must incorporate a more accurate wage variable in future work through
better data collection and/or better variable definition.
Future Research Questions
I believe the surveys ask relevant and useful questions. Some questions could be
refined, limiting possible misinterpretations. The number of questions could be reduced,
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although I now have a wealth of information for future study. For example, I can study
whom the teachers and directors are, their contracts or written procedures submitted
voluntarily with their surveys, or why people quit. Results from further study of this
data could add to, clarify, substantiate, weaken or not relate to my present results.
It is worth testing for other relationships in the model such as a relationship
between more worker voice and better management. As Hirschman (1970) notes and I
would hypothesize, worker voice can improve management behavior both by shining
light on a problem and suggesting or initiating improvement strategies.
I see and experience voice in action in my workplace at the university. My
survey respondents described voice in action at their programs in their answers to the
survey questions. Voice is a construct, a theory that I operationalized through the
identification of related aspects and practices that may be present in a workplace. I
believe voice exists and can be measured as I have done in this project, and possibly in
other ways as well. It is a useful concept in uncovering possible motivations and
outcomes of actions or policies in a group with unequal and overlapping power. Voice
is not a definitive one-size-fits-all gadget, but rather a collective process with a wide
scope of practicality and possibility specific to those involved. Whether a “voice-filled”
institution is more successful than a non-voice-filled institution depends on how success
is defined. In this project, I defined success narrowly, as lower turnover. The unions in
my data are “voice-filled” institutions and more successful than the non-union programs
with less voice. Is this true elsewhere?
Of the five aspects and products of voice I studied, two (career lattices and staff
meetings) do not matter to turnover in this data, though there was little variability in the
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percentage of observations that did and did not report using them. Grievance procedures
reported in more than 85 percent of programs were statistically significant in many
regressions. Joint empowered committees, used more by non-union programs, and exit
interviews, more by unions, were statistically significant in more analyses than other
aspects. However, they were reported present by fewer observations (table 12). How
would greater variability in the use of the other voice aspects change the results? A
larger sample size and/or additional voice variables might elucidate this issue.
Recent Developments
My research is consistent with what others are doing. At least two-thirds of state
legislatures are debating ECE costs, merits, access, quality, quantity, capacity and
workforce issues. As discussed in chapter 2, several states administer marginally
successful wage-supplementation programs (U.S. Child Care WAGE$ Project) to
encourage teachers to gain more education and stay in the field. Thirty-one states have
established core competencies, areas of skills, knowledge and understanding necessary
to provide high-quality care. Twenty-nine states have implemented career ladders, and
26 have established standards for training (Marshall et al. 2005). In early 2009,
Washington passed the Quality Child Care Bill which allows “child-care directors and
workers to collectively bargain with the state over matters within the state’s purview to
improve the quality of child care for Washington families” including subsidy rates
(Center for the Child Care Workforce March 2009).
Other organizations are studying the problem. The National Association for the
Education of Young Children has developed five standards for the preparation of ECE
professionals. These comprehensive standards are what NAEYC believes “tomorrow’s
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teachers should know and be able to do.” The standards state that well-prepared early
childhood professionals should have extensive knowledge of child development and
how to apply it, along with recognition of the range and influences of culture, economic
conditions, health and learning styles on development; value all families and
communities and create respectful reciprocal relationships; understand and use effective
assessment strategies to influence child development and learning; use developmentally
effective teaching strategies in appropriate subjects; and identify themselves as early
childhood professionals who adhere to high ethical standards, demonstrate selfmotivation, collaboration and continuous learning, advocate for children and families
and “cultivate their role as professionals doing critical work” (National Association for
the Education of Young Children 2006).
Massachusetts
In 2005, the Massachusetts legislature created the nation’s first board and
consolidated state agency, the Department of Early Education and Care, to be
responsible for all aspects of care and education for the state’s youngest residents.
DEEC works to improve ECE quality, accessibility and affordability.
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, noting early education’s positive fiscal
impacts, was one of 16 in the country who proposed increasing pre-k funding for FY09.
Despite a $1.2 billion deficit in Massachusetts, Patrick proposed a 22 percent and the
legislature agreed to an 11 percent increase in the state’s pre-k investment. Among other
line items, this increased funds for early childhood professional development (Pre-K
Now April 2008, September 2008). Patrick also moved the state closer to his pre-kthrough-20 vision for education. This is a lot of money, especially in difficult financial
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times. It shows commitment and an understanding of where pre-k belongs in a more
complete educational system.
In July 2008, the legislature passed and Patrick signed a second bill, An Act
Related to Early Education and Care, to enhance DEEC’s original enabling statute. It
covers a broad range of programs and initiatives, including continued development of
the Massachusetts Universal Pre-Kindergarten Program (UPK), program quality
standards and developmental benchmarks, educational evaluation tools and a
performance measurement system. It requires implementation of a regional coordination
system and adds new licensing responsibilities to DEEC. Under workforce
development, the law requires DEEC to facilitate professional development of the ECE
workforce by providing for training programs and professional development (in English
and other languages), establishing ways to recognize and reward educational
advancement, and requiring core competencies in training be aligned with approved
program quality standards (Early Education for All January 2008, July 2008).
Although this workforce development system is in the initial stages, there are
initiatives and pilots across the state upon which the coordinated plan hopes to build. A
multi-million dollar scholarship program (Early Childhood Educators Scholarship
Program) to help ECE workers pursue higher education degrees has been part of the
FY06, FY07 and FY08 state budgets. The Massachusetts Board of Higher Education’s
Early Childhood Transfer Compact between public university, state and community
colleges enhances the scholarship program by guaranteeing students who complete
compact programs at community colleges consideration for admission to teacher
education programs at four-year schools and transfer of credit for all core-requirement
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courses passed (Early Education for All January 2008). These two efforts provide
funding and begin to tackle the lack of capacity to prepare and train early childhood
professionals in the higher education system.
Clearly, legislatures, governors and others believe children’s successful early
learning is dependent upon a prepared and qualified early childhood workforce.
Understanding some of the practical and personal constraints these workers face,
programs specifying what credentials must include and aiding workers in acquiring
these enhanced skills and knowledge is in society’s best interest. I agree that a more
qualified workforce is necessary to improving the quality of ECE children receive, but it
is not sufficient.
Most workforce development efforts in this field are focused at the individual
level, implying that properly educating the teacher, director and state licensing staff will
solve the workforce problem. Staff members are accepting this challenge, enrolling in
college while maintaining their employment in ECE. In Massachusetts, more than 1,900
ECE scholarships have been awarded since FY06 (Early Education for All November
2008). However, these educational initiatives will not succeed in a vacuum. More
money and support for professional development will not transform the majority of
programs supplying low-quality care into programs delivering high-quality care. A
revolution at the industry level is required for such change.
In the short-run, professional development initiatives will increase the pool of
qualified candidates and lower turnover due to the tenure requirement conditions of
participation. Care and education provided by these educated and experienced teachers
completing their “tour of duty” will be improved. But with better qualifications and
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work requirements fulfilled, many teachers will leave this unrecognized, physically and
emotionally demanding work for better-paying jobs with more benefits and better hours.
Few who meet the NAEYC standards will be willing to work for $12 an hour.
Unfortunately, like many states, Massachusetts has not sufficiently addressed
the issues of worker voice and pay. The changes under way and under consideration are
too small and not sweeping enough to solve the problem.
My research shows that giving workers voice can have a desirable effect on
tenure. In addition, as Brandon and Martinez-Beck’s (2006) research indicates, a much
larger increase in ECE teacher pay than any existing initiatives include is necessary for
the field to be competitive in a labor market of qualified workers, at least under any
labor market conditions we have experienced thus far.
If such a pay increase came or was mandated by government, it would cause a
revolution in the industry, since improved wages are only a piece of the puzzle. Bettercompensated teachers would need better qualifications, additional licenses, greater
career commitment, respect from others including education professionals, and greater
voice as others seek to hear what ECE professionals have to say about child
development and working in ECE. If a widespread pay increase came from the firm
level, it could be an outgrowth of a revolution initiated in the field, possibly with
workers withholding their labor power, working collectively and giving voice to their
needs and conditions.
Future Possibilities
Qualified child-care professionals need more reasons to stay in the field,
including more money in their pockets, a professional work environment with
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communication and decision processes appropriate to the education and experience
teachers are asked to bring to the job, and a stable revenue stream that encourages longterm investment in quality ECE for all stakeholders.
An ECE labor market where competitive compensation reflects the experience
and education of labor is a necessary and practical goal. The large amount of funds
allocated annually to k-through-12 public education puts the present funding for pre-k
into shameful perspective. Billions of federal and state dollars are allocated through
programs, grants and bills to support and improve k-through 12 education, covering, for
example, low-performing schools, quality improvements, students with disabilities,
teacher education and loan forgiveness, data and technology systems, child outcome
assessments, standards development, school construction and accreditation, plus
partnership grants and access to U.S. Treasury bonds.
Like kindergarten teachers before them, pre-k workers must be wholly brought
into the system, recognizing their present and future contributions as equal with
elementary and secondary education.1 Only then there will be a predictable revenue
stream and comparable compensation for early childhood teachers.
The Power of Bargaining
Both public policy intervention and collective action can improve the efficiency
of market outcomes by empowering workers. The legislation in Massachusetts that
created the DEEC was an outgrowth of an ongoing community organizing campaign,
Early Education for All by Strategies for Children Inc.
In California, initiatives to win better compensation were hindered by the lack of
organization affiliations among ECE workers, so advocates developed a Child

149

Development Corps under C.A.R.E.S. (Compensation and Recognition Encourage
Stability) to create a group affiliation for workers for advocating, organizing and
professional development. This led to more involvement by organized labor, resulting
in the C.A.R.E.S. legislation co-sponsored by the California State Labor Federation
(Whitebook and Eichberg 2001).
Historically, unionization has been associated with the manufacturing industry
in the United States. However, by 2006 the union presence in the service sector was
greater than that of manufacturing; this was so in 2007 and 2008 as well (Schmitt and
Zipperer 2007).
Recall from chapter 3, Freeman and Medoff (1984) found that unionization
raised wages and greatly reduced the exit behavior of workers paid the same wages. In
addition, unionization had a larger effect on tenure in the service industry than in
manufacturing or construction. A 2009 report from the Center for Economic and Policy
Research, “Unions and Upward Mobility for Service-Sector Employees” (Schmitt),
shows that these effects remain. CEPR found that unionization raises the wages of the
typical service-sector worker by 10.1 percent and increases the likelihood that a service
sector worker will have health insurance and/or a pension in comparison to their nonunion peers. For employees in the 15 lowest-paying occupations of this sector,
including child care, unionization raises wages even more, by 15.5 percent. The
likelihood of having health insurance and/or pension benefits also was greater than for
the typical service-sector worker (Schmitt 2009). My results regarding Massachusetts’
child-care unions concur.
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This is not surprising, since workers in low-paying occupations typically have
little bargaining power and therefore more to gain by bargaining collectively. Child-care
workers initiated the movement for worth wages in the early 1990s. However, most
ECE workers are not represented by a CBA or members of a work-related organization.
Therefore, they most likely have not been represented in the planning or initiation of
policies attempting to meet their needs. My findings show that with collective
bargaining, ECE workers earn more, are more likely to have health insurance associated
with their jobs and experience lower turnover.
The combined need of unions for new members and child-care advocates for
effective strategies to increase public and private investment in child care has
encouraged organizers to take a closer look at the industry, including Head Start, centerbased and home-based child care. Nationally, SEIU is organizing family child-care
providers. This is a difficult labor force to organize because these workers, who are selfemployed, work out of their homes as small businesses. By the beginning of 2009, more
than 90,000 family child-care providers had joined SEIU Kids First.
Only eleven states allow these independent workers the right to form a union.
Despite the failure of ballot question 3 in 2006, SEIU Local 888 continues to work with
Massachusetts family child-care providers to help them earn the right to form a union
for better working conditions.
While pushing for increased public financial responsibility of ECE, organizing
to improve working environments can be successful at the program and community
level. My work joins the extensive literature that shows unions and organized employee
associations in many sectors have a positive economic impact, including raising wages
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and benefits of union and non-union workers, increasing productivity, reducing income
inequality, reducing worker turnover, and increasing the retention of firm-specific
skilled employees (U.S. Congress 2009). It seems clear that real change from
government is unlikely unless policymakers feel a strong movement of constituents on
the ground demanding they be heard and involved.
As discussed in chapter 2, the peaks and valleys of the business cycle over the
last 30 years have not significantly altered the trends in ECE demand or turnover.
Despite the uncertain economic future, the issues and concerns surrounding ECE and
her workers are unlikely to diminish. As more work is done on this issue, the public will
become better educated and able to recognize quality ECE. Hopefully this will foster an
understanding of the vital education and dedicated service provided by those we pay to
care for our youngest citizens.
I hope my findings aid in creating more comprehensive workforce development
programs that not only improve individual qualifications but also provide workers with
what they voice necessary to stay, and care for and educate children well.
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Notes
1

It took kindergarten teachers nearly 100 years to become considered the equals
of public school teachers (Barbara Beatty 1995).
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